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PREFACE 
 
The thesis is part of the International Master in Management of IT (IMMIT) which is a 
triple master diploma programme. The scope of the research is the second payment ser-
vice directive (PSD2) and related aspects of cyber security. The choice of this topic is 
motivated by my personal interest in cyber security in its entirety. Almost every day there 
are news of security breaches where digital safety of many individuals is being compro-
mised. I believe that the topic of personal cyber security is only going to become more 
important matter of everybody’s life. Therefore, in order to connect it with business as-
pect, I have decided to explore the implications that the revised payment service directive 
brings in terms of cyber security. My goal was to understand the changes that said di-
rective had introduced and become more aware payment service user. Particularly, due to 
my extensive personal use of many FinTech solutions available on the market. The com-
pleted research that I am providing you with in this paper is not only a result of my own 
work, but also help of many amazing people. I would like to thank all participants that 
have decided to help me conduct the research and answer to my questions from the Dutch 
ING, Bank of Aruba as well as Polish company BlueMedia. On top of that, I would like 
to thank my dad Maciek, who gave me a lot of constructive criticism and proved to be 
irreplaceable reader, my mom Marta for mental support, my girlfriend Krysia for resolv-
ing the many doubts I had and others who were there when I needed to talk. I cannot 
forget about my friends from IMMIT Cohort 11, who made the time spent in the pro-
gramme so unforgettable, Last but not least my supervisor Prof. dr. A.F. Rutkowski for 
her work and support when I needed it the most. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Problem indication 
As technology is evolving, it is constantly entering new areas of people’s life. In 
the recent years, a major change has also come to the financial world. Digitalization of 
banking made a huge remark on how consumers spend and manage their money and ser-
vices introduced throughout the years allowed for more intuitive and simplified operation. 
The number of digital transactions is increasing drastically. According the report “Digital 
Payment Market by Type, Solution Type, Deployment Mode, Organization Size And Re-
gion - Global Forecast to 2023”, the digital payment market is estimated to be USD 38.00 
billion as of the years 2018. By the year 2023, it is forecasted to increase the value to 
USD 86.76 billion with a year-to-year market growth estimated at 18.0%. Some of the 
key drivers for the growth of digital payment market are promotion of digital payment, 
increased importance of smartphones in terms of digital payments and increasing demand 
for higher level of customer service at POS terminals. (MarketsandMarkets (M&M), 
2018) 
The digitalization of payments has created few events on the payment market. 
First of all, traditional banks have benefited from advantages of digital era we are living 
and started to offer services through new channels, including digital banking also present 
on smartphones. Additionally, emergence of new players on the digital payment market 
could be observed. New firms offering services previously provided only by the banks 
have appeared on the market and gained noticeable presence and impact. Most of them 
belong to the increasingly popular group of FinTechs. The presence of said emerging 
businesses on the market is unmistakably noticeable, with a compound annual growth 
rate (CAGR) in the years 2018-2023 estimated at 42.9%. (Orbis Research, 2018) There-
fore, the innovative payment service providers have a fair chance at competing with more 
traditional banks. Payment service providers are obligated to follow regulations imple-
mented by the PSD2, but are also given an opportunity to apply for a license under the 
PSD2. Licensee is allowed to operate in all EU/EEA member countries, despite having 
applied for said license in only one country. However, without the license made under 
PSD2, all payment service providers are prohibited from offering any service starting 
from 13th of January 2018. (Huiskes & Elsenga, 2017) 
 The first service payment directive has been introduced on 13 November 
2007 by the European Council and is known as PSD 1. Its main purpose was to unify the 
payment area within European Union and allow for faster and more secure transfers which 
would resemble the simplicity of domestic payments. The main result was introduction 
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of the SEPA (Single Euro Payments Area) which is based on the legal framework intro-
duced by the PSD 1. (European Commission, n.d.) 
Following the success of PSD 1, the European Commission in response to the 
changes in financial market mentioned earlier decided to introduce a Second Payment 
Service Directive (PSD2), which aims to regulate some of the aspects of newly emerged 
payment service providers. The revised payment service directive (PSD2) has come to 
force quite recently in January 2016. The deadline for transposition into a national legis-
lation was January 2018 and this date could be in fact treated as introduction of PSD2 in 
practical sense. The key objectives of the PSD2 are: 
 
• Easier and safer use of internet payment services 
• Better consumer protection against fraud, abuse and payment problems 
• Promotion of innovative mobile and internet payment services 
• Strengthening of consumer rights 
• Strengthening of the role of European Banking Authority (EBA) in order to coordi-
nate, supervise and draft technical standards 
(European Commission, n.d.) 
 
One of the biggest concerns of the digital transformation of the banking industry 
and increasingly popular external payment service providers is aspect of cyber security. 
Cyber security as defined by Merriam-Webster dictionary means “measures taken to pro-
tect a computer or computer system (as on the Internet) against unauthorized access or 
attack” (Merriam-Webster dictionary, n.d.) The introduction of new ways of accessing 
and operating digital payments allow at the same time for new forms of threats to arise. 
As the European Commission has stated in the prelude to PSD2 – “In recent years, the 
security risks relating to electronic payments have increased. This is due to the growing 
technical complexity of electronic payments, the continuously growing volumes of elec-
tronic payments worldwide and emerging types of payment services. Safe and secure 
payment services constitute a vital condition for a well- functioning payment services 
market. Users of payment services should therefore be adequately protected against such 
risks. Payment services are essential for the functioning of vital economic and social ac-
tivities.” Therefore, in order to allow for prosperous growth of the digital payments, di-
rectives such as PSD2 are necessary to be implemented.  
1.2 Problem statement and research questions 
Although the directive is quite new, mainly due to the fact it was an important 
step for the entire banking service market and the European-wide implementation 
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requirement it is very well documented and explained throughout number of various 
sources. The academic papers revolting around PSD2 are a little more scarce, however 
they are present as well. What is missing however is a comprehensive review of the im-
pact of the PSD 2 directive on cyber security of the payment users from a more empirical 
point of view. The regulations and guidelines are only valuable if they have practical 
implications and cause tangible changes. In order to fully understand the meaning of the 
directive, it is worth analyzing its purpose from academic perspective. In-depth analysis 
utilizing scientific theories allows for a better comprehension of issues it is trying to re-
solve. As the aspect of cyber security is one of the most important elements of second 
payment service directive as well as the entire digital world, the main research question 
derived is as follows: 
 
What are the purpose and implications of PSD2 on cyber security of payment 
service user and what is it’s empirical impact on affected parties? 
 
In order to answer the main research question, additional supplementary research 
questions need to be evaluated: 
 
Research Question 1: Which academic theory most accurately reflects the mecha-
nisms and purpose in terms of cyber security of the second payment directive? 
 
Research Question 2: What changes in terms of cyber security does the PSD2 intro-
duces to the payment process from perspective of payment user? 
 
Research Question 3: What are the empirical changes in terms of cyber security and 
business practices that the banks, third party providers and others had experienced 
as a result of implementation of PSD2? 
1.3 Thesis structure 
First part of the paper is focused on literature review. All relevant key terms are 
defined and analyzed with a specific attention on their importance in terms of second 
payment service directive. Importantly, all parties which are affected by the directive are 
clearly stated and their role is defined. A more in-depth description and analysis of the 
directive in question is provided as well to allow for comprehensive understanding of its 
scope and implications. As nowadays most recent information are published in the first 
place in the internet, this paper is generously utilizing internet resources in search for 
most up-to-date and relevant data. However academic sources are also used in 
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considerable number, especially in aspects which are less rapidly changing. As the paper 
is concerning regulatory issues, the actual directives are a great source of information, 
henceforth they are widely used as well. 
Following, the paper answers for the first research question by providing an in-
depth review of selected literature which deals with aspects of cyber security in order to 
find underlying purpose for implementation of PSD2 directive and similar regulations 
which can be implemented in the future. The theories which are found in the selected 
literature are given and evaluated and later compared to each other. The results of the 
comparison are presented in the chart for easier reference and conclusion is being made 
as for the most suitable theory choice. 
Next, the paper deals with more concrete aspects of the second payment service 
directive in terms of its implication for cyber security of payment service user. The spe-
cific articles of the directive are being analyzed in order to understand their impact on 
cyber security. Specifically, the technical aspects and regulations will be analyzed in or-
der to create a list of changes that the PSD2 introduces to the payment process in terms 
of cyber security. Importantly, the directive is also compared with a EBA regulation 
which is a related paper.  
Lastly, the research will deal with real-life implications of the PSD2 directive and 
what are the empirical implications resulting from its introduction on affected parties. 
The research will be conducted as a single case-study, which analyzes an impact of PSD2 
with regard to three different parties – bank (represented by Dutch ING); third-party pro-
vider (represented by polish company Blue Media) and legislative (represented by secu-
rity expert of national bank of Aruba).  
1.4 Study Relevance 
1.4.1 Theoretical relevance 
PSD2 is widely discussed topic also in rather popular media outlets. The forecasts 
for its impact are described quite extensively, however the information is scattered across 
many sources, with a very limited number of research papers which provide a compre-
hensive overview of this regulation. Most of said sources also mention cyber security to 
a very limited extent, hence leaving a literature gap. Therefore, this study fills that gap by 
providing a comprehensive analysis of PSD2. The aspect of cyber security will be dealt 
with in the most detailed way, however the entire regulation will be explained accord-
ingly, in order to allow the reader to fully understand its impact and parties which are 
affected by it. Only when concerned the entire scope implications of the directive, the 
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paper will be narrowing down the aspect to cyber security. Importantly, the said paper 
will also be considering different theories which are explaining the purpose of the imple-
mentation of said regulations from perspective of cyber security of payment user. This 
should allow for a better explanation of motives of implementation of cyber security laws 
such as PSD2, which can be useful for future legislators as well as payment market par-
ticipants. It is quite likely, that the theoretical analysis of PSD2 directive has not been yet 
provided otherwise. 
1.4.2 Practical relevance 
The research conducted in this paper allow for few practical outcomes. First of 
all, the extensive literature review allows for a clear and comprehensive understanding of 
the implication of the directive. This can be utilized also by market participants to derive 
a concrete examples of actions that need to be undertaken to fully benefit from the possi-
bilities given by the directive, but also use it as a checklist for requirements to fulfill. The 
results of the theoretical analysis should allow for a better understanding of cyber security 
implications from perspective of the payment user. Therefore, the aspect of payment user 
behaviors can be later used also for instance in marketing operations. With a better 
knowledge about user needs, payment service providers can better aim their marketing 
techniques, as well as use this knowledge to strengthen their selling points in creation of 
their offer and future services. 
Moreover, the results of the research conducted in the further part of the paper 
should allow businesses to see how analyzed institutions have benefited from introduction 
of the PSD2. The research conducted will give information on empirical changes and 
factors that have been observed by industry experts. This should be a good starting point 
for some businesses operating in the payment services field to compare themselves with 
some of the analyzed parties. This study is completed with help of three very diverse 
payment market participants. One of them consists of a traditional bank – ING, based in 
the Netherlands. The implications for a traditional party such as bank are particularly 
interesting due to the fact of change management that the institution needs to undertake 
in order to provide same or increased service value to their customers. Another participant 
in the research is Bank of Aruba representative who shows the legislation and regulatory 
point of view on implementation of PSD2. Despite the fact that Bank of Aruba has not 
yet implemented the second payment service directive, they are intensively working on 
this process, therefore their perspective can present a lot of valuable information regard-
ing the change from outdated laws and regulations to modern PSD2 directive. Lastly, the 
third party payment service providers are represented by a company BlueMedia, who acts 
as a payment initiation service provider and is based in Poland. Their input should allow 
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for a better perspective on implications of PSD2 from a perspective of FinTech or emerg-
ing business. 
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TPPs 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 PSD2 – key related terms 
In order to fully understand the objectives of the second payment service directive 
it is important to understand the parties that are specified in the act as well as the concepts 
that the regulation in question is introducing. The participants on the payment market 
have previously been undetermined and underregulated, which resulted in vague ability 
to supervise them from the perspective of law and law enforcement institutions such as 
central bank or financial supervision authority agency. Hence, clear definition of payment 
market parties does not only allow for better understanding of said market participants, 
but also specifies laws which apply to them. 
2.1.1  List of parties defined by PSD2 
There are essentially 3 main payment institutions which are described by the di-
rective. Two of them - Payment Initiation Service Providers (PISP) and Account Infor-
mation Service Providers (AISP) can be grouped together as Third Party Providers (TPP). 
Outside of that group are Account Servicing Payment Service Providers (ASPSP) which 
are entities that are holding customer’s payment accounts therefore providing also more 
primary banking services. The following relation can be easily distinguished on the dia-
gram below: 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Institutions outlined in PSD2 
(Husek, Brich, & Prochazka, 2017) 
 
The PSD2 specifies certain characteristics that the participants in the payment ser-
vice market possess. In order to fully comprehend their role on the payment market it is 
worth analyzing their role.  A more in-depth definitions of the participants are as follow: 
 
PISP (Payment 
Initation Service 
Provider
AISP (Account 
Information 
Service Provider)
ASPSP (Account 
Servicing Payment 
Service Provider)
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• Account Servicing Payment Service Providers (ASPSP) are financial institutions 
which hold payment accounts and are issuing payments or are the recipients of such 
payments. They can be described as the traditional financial entities and consists of 
mainly traditional banks. 
• Payment Service User (PSU) simply is the consumer or retailer, who is the final user 
of services offered by TPPs or AS PSPs. 
• Payment Initiation Service Providers (PISP) is the entity which initiates the payment 
created by the account owner between the PSU (customer) and ASPSP (usually the 
bank). They are given permission from PSU to handle online banking payments – 
they are usually the newly emerging FinTech businesses. 
• Account Information Service Providers (AISP) is the entity which is given access to 
account information by account holder (PSU). Often, they are the same businesses as 
PISP, as they can both handle information as well as initiate the payments, however 
it does not necessarily need to be the case. 
2.1.2 Application Programming Interface (API) 
Before diving into the concept of Access to Account (XS2A) and Open Banking, 
it is important to understand the underlying technology which allows it to operate. The 
technology in question is Application Programming Interface, often simply referred to as 
API.  
APIs are one of the drivers which allow for a quick revolution in the fields of cloud com-
puting, mobile applications, Internet of Things (IoT) and many more. (Jensen, 2015) The 
concept of APIs is very multi-level, however at the very basic it can be defined as – 
“code that allows two software programs to communicate with each other” (Rouse, Nolle 
Tom, & Li Thomas, 2017) Moreover, it can be described as a systematic way of sharing 
data, it allows for an easier collaboration and access to information. (Zachariadis & 
Ozcan, 2017) The use of APIs in banking, especially in the US, dates decades back. They 
have been put in use mainly in financial management software, to present billing details 
at the bank websites as well as they have been utilized extensively by payment card pro-
viders such as Visa and MasterCard in their networks. (Brodsky & Oakes, 2017) One of 
the drivers for recent development and increase in popularity of APIs is the introduction 
of the smartphone. A lot of mobile apps rely on the APIs in order to exchange data from 
and to the device. However APIs find a great use not only in mobile applications, but also 
are widely used in new generation responsive websites. They characterize with a light-
weight implementation and simplicity of data exchange format. From a more technical 
point of view, APIs can be described as a rather small server-side applications. (Jensen, 
2015)  
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Figure 2 Three types of APIs 
(Brodsky & Oakes, 2017) 
2.1.3 Access to account (XS2A) 
Another aspect which is introduced by PSD2 is Access to account (XS2A). Finan-
cial institutions which include banks are obligated by PSD2 to provide access to account 
to a licensed third-parties. Importantly, the payments which are executed by the third-
party providers (TPPs) cannot be anyhow discriminated. What it is basically allowing is 
bypassing of the “middle-men” in an e-commerce ecosystem. Essentially, XS2A means 
that  for example the merchant can directly connect with customer’s bank in order to 
execute payment which is done through a third-party. This could in the future eliminate 
the need for in-store point of sale and hence revolutionize the way customers pay for their 
goods. But this will not only affect purchases in physical stores, but also online shopping. 
After implementation of all of the aspects of PSD2, instead of purchasing certain products 
or services using a payment card, payment user can be asked instead to give retailer access 
to their bank account. After agreeing, the merchant can take the payment user to internet 
banking site where the user gives required permission to execute the payment. This can 
be compared to giving permission for using third-party login information in order to ac-
cess websites (i.e. using Facebook login on websites utilizing Facebook API). The pay-
ment user will not provide the merchant with his bank login details, but instead give per-
mission to the exemplar store in order to execute payment on behalf of the user via users 
bank account. (Sebastian, 2017) The security implications of such solutions will be eval-
uated in later part of this paper. 
Internal - APIs which 
are used only within 
enterprise/institution
Partner/B2B - APIs 
utilized by business 
partners, providers, 
resellers
Public - APIs used by 
external partners, 
often for innovative 
products and apps
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Figure 3 Communication before PSD2 & XS2A 
Source: (Hemon-Laurens, 2015) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Hemon-Laurens, 2015) 
 
According to the report by consulting firm Ernst & Young, XS2A is considered 
by financial institutions to be the most critical aspect of the PSD2, mainly due to the 
expected implementation efforts, business and technical impacts and risk mitigation ef-
forts that have to be conducted by ASPSPs. However, while implemented, payment ini-
tiation service providers (PISP) as well as account information service providers (AISP) 
Customer
Online 
assets
Customer 
Bank 
Account
Customer 
Online assets 
Customer 
Bank account 
API 
TPP 
(New services) 
Figure 4 Communication with PSD2 & XS2A 
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can create new business opportunities for both established and new market participants. 
This could lead to reengineering, enlarging or improving products and services offered. 
(Ernst & Young S.A., 2018) 
2.1.4 Open-banking 
Open banking consists of collaborative model, where banking data is being shared 
through APIs between two or more unaffiliated parties in order to deliver enhanced mar-
ketplace capabilities. It is no different than the concept of Access to Account (XS2A) 
mentioned earlier, but it is one of the proposed solutions in order to standardize it. 
 Open Banking is an initiative created by Open Banking Limited, which is a non-
profit organization based in UK. However, although it is not operating European-wide, 
the term Open Banking has become a synonym for access to account solutions. There is 
a number of potential benefits that are expected resultants of use of Open Banking: crea-
tion of new revenue streams, improved customer experience and creation of sustainable 
service model for markets which were previously underserved. (Brodsky & Oakes, 2017)  
2.1.5 Financial Technology (FinTech) 
FinTech is a term widely used in connotation with PSD2. Businesses which are 
affected by PSD2 are often described with a term FinTech, henceforth understanding how 
they have emerged on the market is valuable in terms of the understanding of the current 
market of payment providers. It is worth noting as well that thanks to second payment 
service directive, FinTech can observe even higher rise of growth, mainly thanks to low-
ering barriers to entry and data-sharing among financial institutions. 
The term “Financial Technology” often abbreviated to “FinTech” can be simply 
explained as use of technology in order to deliver financial solutions. One of the defini-
tions of FinTech was presented by (Kawai, 2016) and it suggests that it is a ”technologi-
cally enabled financial innovation. It is giving rise to new business models, applications, 
processes and products. These could have a material effect on financial markets and in-
stitutions and the provision of financial services.” FinTech although it is perceived as a 
recent trend that goes only to early 2010s has been present in the banking industry much 
longer, with the term FinTech being traced to early 90s. (Arner, Barberis, & Buckley, 
2016) Definition stated earlier, although correct and accurate does not show the whole 
picture of what FinTech industry actually is nowadays. The increasingly popular FinTech 
firms can certainly be described as innovative. The main goals are to change the way 
customers are using banks and increase access to financial services, mainly for customers 
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familiar with new technologies. Moreover, the individuals and business thanks to FinTech 
are able to invest and borrow money more easily, the transactions and payments are safer 
and cheaper. The rate of transactions previously often neglected and sometimes taking 
even days to execute is now reduced to almost an instance. FinTech industry essentially 
challenges everything that has been established in the financial world so far and tries to 
reinvent it. (Mackenzie, 2015) Moreover, there are many FinTech services that distribute 
insurances, various other financial instruments or other third-party services. The term 
FinTech can also refer to companies that provide technology to providers of financial 
services. (Dorfleitner, Hornuf, Schmitt, & Weber, 2017) Interestingly, FinTech busi-
nesses are gaining surprisingly high confidence levels from its customers. According to 
a survey made in 2015, Americans have a higher level of trust in FinTech or overall Tech-
nological firms handling their financial information rather than traditional banks. The 
bank with the highest level of trust which is listed in the study is Wells Fargo, with con-
fidence of 44%. On the other hand, purely technological firm PayPal can boast a trust 
level reaching 73%, along Amazon (71%), Google (64%) and Apple (57%) all well ex-
ceeding trust levels of traditional banks. (McCarthy, 2015) 
2.1.6 Neobanks 
PSD2 does not directly specifies or defines Neobanks per se, this paper is neither 
evaluating them in great detail, but in order to understand the full picture of market situ-
ation of payment service providers it is good to briefly discuss them.  
Essentially, Neobanks are a sub-group of FinTechs and could be assigned Account 
Servicing Payment Service Providers (ASPSP) characteristics. According to 
(Minarchenko, 2018) Neobanks are financial institutions which offer a combination of 
checking accounts, saving accounts and debit cards through digital channels. Importantly, 
they offer their services only through mobile applications and do not have any physical 
branches. The applications themselves are often simplified with ease of use in mind. Of-
ten, they offer additional features to allow for easier saving and spending habits by im-
plementing expense categorization and ability to easily track incomes and outflows.  
Therefore, Neobanks are using fully digital platform built from ground-up, hence not only 
serving as simplified front-end of traditional banking platforms. 
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The main advantages of Neobanks over traditional brick and mortar established busi-
nesses is usually lower interest rates and fees, 24/7 customer support through the mobile 
app and extremely transparent display of transaction costs. Often the ATM withdrawal 
costs are also free of extra costs (to certain given limits), there are no costs associated 
with running the account, the products are based on prepaid services, which eliminate the 
overdraft fees. Importantly, the transactions are online-only, meaning the balance dis-
played on the smartphone represents the actual amount of money in the possession on the 
account. Neobanks have been primarily based with deposit focus in mind, though due to 
increase in popularity they are starting to slowly evolve into more advanced types of ser-
vices. 
The rate of growth of Neobank companies is also staggering. One of the most 
popular bank-in-the-app companies – Revolut has gained a status of a unicorn in 2018. 
This means that their valuation has exceeded 1 billion dollars. (Schwienbacher, 2019) 
However, it is not the only example of a unicorn among banking-oriented FinTechs. Ger-
man Neobank N26 at the beginning of 2019 has raised $300 million through series D 
funding round, which has brought its overall funding to over $500 million and valuation 
to $2.7 billion mark. (Nonninger, 2019) 
Figure 5 Comparision of Neobanks, Digital Banks and Traditional Banks 
Source: (Brockhurts, 2019) 
Traditional Banks 
Digital Banks 
Neobanks 
Brick & Mortar 
Branch locations 
Backed by large  
financial institution 
Online Banking 
Mobile Apps 
No Brick & Mortar 
locations 
100% Mobile, 
Start-ups 
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2.2 Cyber security 
Understanding of cyber security is quite essential in the process of analyzing reg-
ulations which are aiming to improve it. Therefore, before looking at particular examples 
of changes that the PSD2 introduces in terms of cyber security, clearly defining and com-
prehending this aspect will be necessary. 
 According to (Von Solms & Van Niekerk, 2013), cyber security can be described 
as a set of certain technologies, assurances, best practices, training, actions, risk manage-
ment approaches, guidelines, security safeguards, security concepts, policies and other 
tools. The purpose of all of these concepts is protection of the cyber environment, organ-
izations or institutions and importantly user’s assets. The said assets can consist of com-
puter devices which are connected to world-wide-web, personnel, computer infrastruc-
ture, digital applications, services, systems concerning telecommunication and data stored 
or transmitted within the cyber environment. Moreover, cybersecurity is aiming to 
achieve certain level of security properties of the organization. The authors provide three 
main objectives of security which are: availability, integrity and confidentiality.  
 A few concepts and characteristics of cyber security given above are essential, 
however it is also worth to show its origin. All aspects of cyber security measures starts 
with a legal violation in form of a fraud. As the legal dictionary suggests, frauds is “the 
intentional use of deceit, a trick or some dishonest means to deprive another of his/her/its 
money, property or a legal right (...)”. (“Legal Dictionary | Law.com,” n.d.). Essentially, 
cyber security is a measure in order to limit fraud which is being committed in digital 
environment. Previously, fraud was an act committed in physical sense, however due to 
the increasing digitalization, number of criminal activities committed online have been 
also rising in popularity. 
 One of the act of fraud which is being done digitally is cyber-identity theft. Cyber-
identity theft is concerning a theft or misappropriation of identity tokens. Some of the 
common types of online identity tokens consist of email address, websites and authenti-
cation mechanisms such as a combination of username and password which is used to 
access personal information for instance banking account. (Sweeney, 2006) There are 
number of methods that are used in cyber-identity theft. Some of them are listed by (Paget, 
2007) to be “hacking, phishing, pharming, traffic redirectors, advance-fee frauds, fake 
taxation forms, keyloggers and password stealing”. Interestingly, there are number of in-
dividuals who despite having their identity tokens stolen, were not aware of the form that 
the credentials have been leaked. They are aware of the fact that the vulnerable data has 
been compromised, however many of them are not able to point the source of theft. 
 It is also believed, that the importance of cyber security is increasing with emer-
gence of FinTech, who’s part are third party payment services. With the increasing num-
ber of cyber-attacks, financial institutions are obligated to continue to improve their cyber 
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security frameworks, which can be achieved by gathering, examining and sharing cyber-
related data information. (Stewart & Jürjens, 2018) Therefore, the directives such as 
PSD2 need to address aspects of cybersecurity in order to provide such frameworks on 
European-wide financial markets. 
2.3 The selection of relevant academic theories used in the research 
The following academic theories are a result of literature research conducted on 
several academic journals. The list of articles have been selected through a use of search 
term – “cyber defense” in some of the journals available. The assumption is that the re-
sultant papers would be related to discipline of cyber security, which is the perspective 
this paper intends to make in terms of the second payment service directive. Hence, the 
resultant papers have been analyzed in terms of the theories used and along with the con-
text have been presented in the chart that can be found in the appendix to this paper. From 
the analyzed scientific works, which were 27 in total, came from 4 academic journals: 
MIS Quarterly (MISQ), Communications of the Association for Information Systems 
(CAIS), Journal of the Association for Information Systems (JAIS), Hawaii International 
Conference on System Sciences (HICSS) and Decision Analysis (DA). It is worth point-
ing out that the sources that have been selected to not total for the all available papers 
related to cyber security in those journals. They are however, the pre-selected batch that 
have been coded for purposes of this work. Hence, the limitation of this strategy can be 
seen in the range of the theories listed. Nevertheless, the selection of relevant theories is 
wide enough to create a scientific value in terms of analysis of the second payment service 
directive. The identified theories, in order to provide them in a more comprehensive and 
clear manner are listed in the chart below, along main conceptual elements of the theory. 
Following, the overview of each theory is provided, which should allow for more com-
prehensive understanding and easier comparison with mechanisms of the PSD2. From all 
the theories that have been identified and listed in the appendix, the selected five are 
already a pre-selected range that applies to a bigger extent with the purposes of the second 
payment service directive. 
2.3.1 Technology threat avoidance theory 
The purpose of Technology Threat Avoidance Theory (TTAT) is the explanation 
of individual IT users engagement in threat avoidance behaviors. In contrast to many 
studies which are examining IT security from the perspective of organization, TTAT is 
supplying a framework from the perspective of individual user. The authors of the theory 
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are Liang and Xue, who achieved it by synthesizing literature from diverse sources such 
as risk analysis, health care, psychology and information systems. The main principle of 
TTAT is stating that when individual user is perceiving an IT threat, said user will be 
motivated to actively avoid that IT threat. User will be taking a safeguarding measures, 
when they believe that the threat can be indeed avoided by executing said safeguarding 
measures of procedures. The alternative is that the user in case that the threat is treated as 
unavoidable for him will be trying to passively avoid it by executing emotion-focused 
copying, in case that there are no perceived safeguarding measures to be applied. The 
framework also provides factors that are influencing IT users threat avoidance behavior. 
As derived from the cybernetic theory, TTAT argues that user indents to increase the 
distance between their current state and the undesired (unsafe) end state. There are two 
cognitive processes remarked in the TTAT – threat appraisal and coping appraisal. They 
are derived from the coping theory. Therefore, the user first assesses the situation of IT 
threat existence and its degree and later plans the safeguarding actions in order to avoid 
it. According to the theory, threat perception is based on the perceived probability of the 
threat occurrence and the scope of the impact of the threat that is consequences of the 
threat. Moreover, the TTAT suggests that the user has three factors that are used to assess 
the extent to which the threat can be avoided by implementing safeguarding measures. 
The factors are: the effectiveness of the safeguarding measure, the costs of the measure 
and users’ self-efficacy of applying the measure. It is important to state a few additional 
elements of the technology threat avoidance theory that include clarification of the ap-
proach-avoidance distinction and the differentiation between the avoidance of malicious 
threat and acceptance of safeguarding measure. Avoidance and adoption behavior are 
qualitatively different, therefore the application of one theory in different context could 
results in inconsistent or even false findings. As an example given by the authors, the 
study of threat of spyware could not produce the same, consistent findings as study of 
adoption of anti-spyware. In addition to the multi-theory background of the technology 
threat avoidance theory, the authors decided to integrate the view of the process theory 
and variance theory, for testing in process research and variance research purposes. TTAT 
shows IT user’s avoidance behavior in the form of a dynamic positive feedback loop. 
Emergence of malicious IT in the users environment is the starting point of the loop. Once 
aware, the user sets the anti-goal strategy which is sourced by the fact of being harmed 
by malicious IT. Then the coping mechanisms will be involved, as when the user starts 
to perceive their current state, they will engage it. It is done in order to increase the current 
state and the undesired end-state. Threat avoidance behavior is expected to continue until 
the discrepancy becomes too large, hence the threat is expected to disappear. It can be 
said that the variance theory includes the relevant variables to understand threat appraisal, 
coping appraisal and coping in the technology threat avoidance theory. More can be ob-
served on the diagram below. (Liang & Xue, 2018) 
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Figure 6 The process of IT threat avoidance 
(Khan, 2017) 
 
As the authors have made in the remarks to the theory, the potential practical use 
of the framework is quite extensive. Interestingly, some applications include security 
awareness and creation of efficient mechanism for educational purposes of employees 
and other stakeholders. It allows for a good understanding of likelihood of malicious IT 
attacks and its negative impact. TTAT also includes some guidelines in terms of IT prac-
tice. (Khan, 2017) 
2.3.2 General deterrence theory (GDT) 
According to  the General Deterrence Theory (GDT) "posits that individuals can 
be dissuaded from committing antisocial acts through the use of countermeasures, which 
include strong disincentives and sanctions relative to the act" The foundation of the work 
on the subject is based on the work of (Walke & Straub, 1998).  The author argues that 
the GDT can be used as a guideline in order to eliminate a threat to mitigate the risk 
associated with occurrence of such threat by implementation of countermeasures. Some 
of the countermeasures that can be used to eliminate or mitigate risks include training and 
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education, backups and reprimands. The research view of the GDT is expending currently 
to also other sources of threats. Example of such would include non-human factors. 
Therefore, the scope of the GDT theory can be applied also to aspects such as natural 
disasters and technical failures. Preemptive planning is given as one of the mechanisms 
for risk mitigation, examples of such could include creation of backups that would prevent 
data loss or hardware failures. 
2.3.3 Routine Activity Theory (RAT) 
The theory of Routine Activity also known as RAT includes three main elements 
that built up the framework – motivated offender, attractive target and the absence of 
capable guardianship. The factors are converged in space and time. (Cohen & Felson, 
1979) The concept of motivated offenders according to the routine activity theory consists 
of two elements – capability of committing a criminal activity as well as willingness to 
do so. (Felson & Cohen, 1980) The targets that can be perceived as attractive or vulnera-
ble can be a person or an object. Guardianship has been established to be a person or an 
object that works effectively in case of deterring offenses from occurring. In some in-
stances, the crime can be stopped just by the fact that the guardianship is present in time 
and space. Hence, the author of the theory argues that the attractiveness of the target is 
rendered by situation and specificity of the crime. (Felson, 1995) 
 Moreover, the Routine Activity Theory considers the macro-level view, the focus 
is put on patterns of behavior of a victim and the offender in a broad-scale. Additionally, 
the focus is also concentrated on specific crimes and behaviors or decision of the offender. 
According to the Routine Activity Theory, the opportunity is the prime driver for com-
mitting a crime. Interestingly, the theory also provides a perspective of a victim in that 
regard, that it is mainly due to the fact of placing yourself in a situation where crime can 
be committed against you.  
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Figure 7 Routine Activity Theory (RAT) 
Source: (Miller, 2014) 
2.3.4 Protection motivation theory (PMT) 
The purpose of the protection motivation theory was to help understand and clar-
ify the fear appeals. There are essentially four factors that the protection motivation theory 
is built upon. The factors consist of: perceived severity of a threating even, perceived 
probability of the occurrence, vulnerability and the efficacy of the recommended preven-
tive behavior as well as perceived self-efficacy. (Rogers, 1975) There are to elements that 
the protection motivation theory is stemming from and they include threat appraisal and 
coping appraisal. First of all, the threat appraisal role is to assess the severity of the situ-
ation and hence also asses the seriousness of the situation. The response to the situation 
is based on the coping appraisal. Moreover, the coping appraisal includes both efficacy 
and self-efficacy. By efficacy is the ability of an individual to process recommendations 
or other guidelines in order to mitigate or remove threat. Whereas, the concept of self-
efficacy is the possibility of an individual to process the recommendations for an action 
in a successful manner. (Pechmann, Zhao, Goldberg, & Reibling, 2003)  
 The protection motivation theory is particularly useful in terms of suggesting op-
tional behaviors changing in order to explain individuals on how to disengage threatening 
practices. Its role is both educational and motivational. The primary prevention that has 
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been proposed by the theory is counter measures, such as not participating in events that 
can lead to threats. The following secondary prevention would be to participate in 
measures in order to prevent the occurrence of a threat from becoming worse. (Maddux 
& Rogers, 1983) 
2.3.5 Theory of planned behavior 
The theory of planned behavior (TPB) is used primarily in psychology. The theory 
links one’s beliefs and behavior. The main elements of the theory state that individual’s 
behavioral intentions and behavior can be shaped by subjective norms and perceived be-
havioral control. The theory has been developed by Icek Azjen, which have built it upon 
the predictive power of the theory of reason actions. The difference being, that TPB in-
cludes perceived behavioral control. Despite its background in psychology, the theory has 
found a vast number of applications, such as studies of sustainability, advertising, politi-
cal campaigns, healthcare, sport management. It was used primarily to research beliefs, 
attitudes as well as behavioral intentions. The diagram below shows the main principles 
and constructs of the theory. (Azjen, 1991) 
 
Figure 8 Theory of planned behavior 
Source: (Azjen, 1991) 
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In order to answer the first research question which states “Which academic the-
ory most accurately reflects the mechanisms and purpose in terms of cyber security of the 
second payment directive?”; the analysis of the theories have been done also in a form of 
a chart below. The theories have been compared by listing their main aspects as well as 
the context of the theory. The chart is presenting the theories only in a very brief manner, 
as detailed overview has been provided in the earlier part of this section.  
 
 
Table 1 Overview of the theories 
Theory Main aspects of 
the theory 
Application to cybersecurity aspect of 
PSD2 
Technology Threat 
Avoidance Theory 
(TTAT) 
IT user’s engage-
ment in threat 
avoidance behav-
iors. 
The theory is based on a synthesis of lit-
erature, therefore provides vast scientific 
background, particularly valuable is the 
fact that IT threats are main element of 
the theory. 
General deter-
rence theory 
(GDT) 
The individuals be-
havior can be af-
fected by strong 
disincentives and 
sanctions. 
Theory present a more single-level point 
of view on a behavior of an individual. 
The application in terms of cyber secu-
rity can be present, however more 
vaguely.  
Routine Activity 
Theory (RAT) 
Importance of moti-
vated offender, at-
tractive target and 
guardianship. 
It is an interesting perspective on the mo-
tivation of the attacker and how targets 
can become less attractive to them by 
providing safeguarding mechanisms. 
Protection motiva-
tion theory (PMT) 
The motivation of a 
user in order to im-
plement protection. 
The theory allows for interesting obser-
vation of motivation to implement cyber 
security measures in case of fear of 
threats. 
Theory of planned 
behavior 
The link between 
beliefs and behav-
ior. 
The norms and behavioral control im-
pact on individuals behavior, however 
the context of regulation can be only 
vaguely connected. 
 
  
32 
 The above table provides in a clearer manner what are the links between the reg-
ulatory aspect of second payment service directive and the academic theories which have 
been selected for research purposes. Hence, the answer the first research question - 
"Which academic theory most accurately reflects the mechanisms and purpose in 
terms of cyber security of the second payment directive?" the theory that is most in-
terestingly linking the two aspects is Technology Threat Avoidance Theory (TTAT). Of 
course, the study could be extended to cover wider range of literature, henceforth a wider 
scope of academic theories, however the limitations have already been mentioned in the 
earlier part of this section. Nevertheless, the link between threat avoidance and stated 
application in IT allows it to be the most comprehensive theory explaining the purposes 
of creation of regulatory acts such as second payment service directive. The PSD2 is con-
cerned with providing and IT user, or particularly a digital payment service user an op-
portunity to avoid threats in face of dangers in cyber environment. Therefore, elements 
mentioned in the TTAT have been well suitable for supplementing the regulation pur-
poses. Particularly, the elements of safeguarding measures and behaviors of the user in 
case of threat identification. The approach of linking theories with practical real-world 
regulations presented in this paper should allow in future to build legislative acts with a 
higher degree of understanding of behavior of the most important party involved – the 
final user.  
2.4 Analysis of main objectives of PSD2 and scope of research of 
said directive and related regulatory acts 
In order to start a more detailed analysis of implications of PSD2 on cyber security 
of payment user, the main objectives of PSD2 are going to be mentioned. Although they 
have been briefly stated in the introductory part of this paper, it is worth to talk about 
them in greater detail. According to the report created by the (Ernst & Young S.A., 2018) 
the main objectives of PSD2 are as follow: 
 
• Digitalization of the payment industry, which can be achieved through integra-
tion and increase in efficiency of European payment market, reducing number 
of exemptions from regulations and reducing market deficiencies.  
• Allowing for a more equal opportunity and therefore improving the competi-
tion of all payment service providers. Allowing for introduction of new players 
on the payment market.  
• Improving the scope of the previous directive by specifying unregulated pay-
ment service providers, transactions and reducing exemptions overall. 
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• Improving customer protection, which go alongside security and safety of the 
payments. The means to achieve this include increasing transparency, security 
of retail payments (i.e by introduction of better authentication mechanism) and 
efficiency. Additionally, the directive also specifies the liabilities and obliga-
tions of the involved parties. 
• Reduction of the general cost of payment, mainly through stimulating compe-
tition which is to reduce the prices for the final payment services user.  
 
 
As given above, security is only one of the aspects of the regulation, however for 
purposes of this thesis it will be the focal point of this research. The further analysis in 
this section will consist of research of three regulatory acts – the main PSD2 directive, 
the guidelines issued by the European Banking Authority (EBA/GL/2017/17) as well as 
the Regulatory Technical Standards (EBA/RTS/2017/02). It is important to include all 
three sources of regulations, as the PSD2 act specifies that some more technical guidelines 
need to be provided in a supplementary act by European Banking Authority. Hence, for 
a full point of view of the implication of the PSD2, one cannot omit the complementary 
directives and regulations. 
2.5 Analysis of articles in directive 2015/2366 (PSD2) from perspec-
tive of cyber security of payment user 
The second payment service directive number 2015/2366 also known as PSD2 is 
widely addressing many security concerns related to payment services. Therefore, this 
section indents to point out the main elements of security regulations that have been men-
tioned under PSD2, which later should allow for a clearer understanding and creation of 
a chart to observe all elements introduced by this act. Due to the scope of this paper, the 
attention will be put on cyber security aspect of said regulations and particularly the im-
pact on the end-customer or in other words the payment service user (PSU). The paper 
will evaluate some of the broader rules of security concerns, yet with cyber security being 
prioritized in all instances. The articles have been selected by their specific impact on 
aspects of cyber security. As cyber security is only one of the aspects addressed by the 
directive, a certain pre-selection was necessary in order to narrow down the scope of said 
regulatory act. In case of some articles, additional information from other supplementary 
sources are provided as well, mainly in order to explain in certain security aspects in 
greater detail and using a real-world examples. The additional sources are indicated ac-
cordingly. The second payment service directive consist of a prelude and core part. Start-
ing with the prelude, the articles in question are as follows: 
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In the point (7) of the prelude in PSD2, it has been mentioned that the security 
risks related to electronic payments have increased for number of reasons. Main concerns 
are the increase in complexity of electronic payments, increasing volume of payments 
being executed and increase in number of types of payments available. 
As stated in point (31); the payment initiation service provider (PISP) is forbidden 
to hold user funds at any stage. Moreover, it requires full authorization if it indents to 
hold user funds. This directly effects banking and FinTech businesses to gain full author-
ization in case of mobile payments. Services such as Google Pay, Apple Pay and such, 
which indeed allow for long-term use of user funds require additional confirmation by 
said user in order to operate. This eliminates risk of such services being “activated” and 
able to execute transactions without full knowledge of the customer. Point (32) also en-
force ASPSP to allow such direct access to PISP. 
Point (75) aiming at reducing risks of card-based payments addresses the issue of 
transactions where the amount charged is unknown when the payment service user (PSU) 
gives its confirmation. The PSP can only block the amount of funds that the user has 
consent to be blocked. This is particularly important in cases of automatic gas stations, 
hotel bookings and car rental places. The PSD2 theoretically should disallow instances 
where certain transactions block funds through payment-cards without a clear information 
and confirmation from the customer. It has been a rather popular method of securing funds 
for certain businesses, but potentially dangerous from the perspective of customer funds 
security. 
In point (96), the directive mentions the basic security measures regarding elec-
tronic and mobile payments. The security measures as said needs to be appropriate to the 
risk involved in the payment service. Basically, the payments are required to be secured 
with personalized security credentials in order to avoid phishing and other types of fraud. 
The directive suggests typical security measures which includes data encryption on per-
sonal device of the payment service user and/or additional confirmation through another 
channel of communication such as email or text message with one-time password. It is 
important that such measures should be used when payment imitation service provider 
(PISP) or account information service provider (AISP) are participating in the infor-
mation exchange process. 
 
The following part comes from the core section of the directive 2015/2366: 
 
First, the article 66 focuses on rules regarding access to payment account in case 
of payment service initiation services. Examples of such services are PayPal, iDEAL, 
PayU and many more of similar nature. Paragraph 3 states the requirements expected 
from PISP most of which clearly effect cyber security aspect of the transactions. 
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Paragraph 3 point (b) states that the security credentials of the payment service user can-
not be shared with other parties, and importantly are transmitted through safe channels. 
This is perhaps one of the basic principles effecting cyber security in banking, where login 
information is key to gain access to user’s account. One of the examples of a system that 
has been misused in the past would be SofortBanking system. It is an example of payment 
initiation service provider (PISP) which required a user to provide banking information 
to their banking service through their website without a use of original ASPSP’s API. The 
service would then log to user’s banking system in order to initiate a transaction, but it 
was presumably done or verified by human employees of SofortBanking, hence the login 
information was accessible to 3rd parties. This service would no longer comply with reg-
ulations implied by the PSD2 initiative and certainly this practice could create a danger 
to cyber security of PSU. (Lech, 2012) Point (c) talks about data privacy during transac-
tions with PISP. According to the directive, information collected about PSU should only 
be provided to the payee and only with consent of the user. This could probably refer to 
many forms of data collection methods, that could potentially breach privacy which is 
part of one’s cyber security. This point eliminates the possibility of PISP to collect data 
about user to later sell it or share it with 3rd parties who could use it for their mainly 
commercial purposes. Point (d) emphasizes the importance of secure exchange of infor-
mation and transparency while identifying PIPS to AS PSP in a clear way.  This is par-
ticularly important, as the bank (AS PSP) needs to verify authenticity of PIPS. This is one 
of the means to fight phishing, where in quite frequent instances, websites try to imitate 
popular PIPS in order to extract money from unaware users. Moreover, point (e) talks 
about storing sensitive payment data of the payment service user. This is yet another ex-
ample which highly aims at reducing risks from cyber security perspective. In case of 
potential breach, with PSD2 in place, data stored by PISP can have no impact on safety 
of the user in case data leak. Point (f) and (g) build upon previous ones especially point 
(c), as they state the importance of confidentiality of information, especially collection of 
information unrelated to the needs of service provided, that could potentially be used for 
customer segregation or use for example in case of personalized advertisements. Unau-
thorized modification of the amount being transferred, or any other aspects of the trans-
action stated in point (h) is rather straight forward and perhaps is the most obvious poten-
tial form of fraud, hence it needs to no explanation. 
Article 67 aims to regulate similar aspects of cyber security and importantly pri-
vacy in regard to payment account information service providers. Similarly, in paragraph 
2, as in case of PISP, service providers need to limit their operations only to ones author-
ized by the user, only where PSU full consent is given (point (a)). Third parties cannot 
gain access to any credentials of the user, and the transfer of such has to be performed in 
a secure way (point (b)).  The information sourced by AISP needs to be limited to those 
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requested by the user (d), cannot be sensitive (e) and cannot be used or stored by AISP 
(f). 
Article 97 and 98 contain the most important regulations regarding the authenti-
cation of the PSU, with article 97 containing some of the authentication requirements and 
article 98 guidelines for more in-depth analysis of security and communication that will 
be further developed by European Banking Authority in separate act. From user’s per-
spective, authentication is perhaps one of the only and certainly most important aspects 
of risk mitigation in terms of cyber security. Henceforth, the following paragraph will 
evaluate in detail said regulations with cyber security as the main aspect given in the 
PSD2 directive. 
As article 97, paragraph 1 states, that the user’s authentication needs to be required 
in every instance where user is accessing its payment account online, initiates an elec-
tronic payment transaction as well as make any action through a remote channel which 
could result in payment fraud or other abuse. This is particularly interesting as quick pay-
ment options are still available for card payments, often requiring only a log-in to mer-
chant’s site, but do not require additional authorization to make a payment. This is a sys-
tem used for example by Amazon. The website saves essentially all credentials of banking 
card and on authorized computer do not require any further details to proceed with trans-
action. It is worth pointing out that such option is possible only with card being selected 
as a payment method. Interestingly, according to Arno Voerman (2016), in this matter 
PSD 2 has not full addressed credit card providers and allowed for such loophole in se-
curity. Credit cards, according to the Association of Credit Card Issuers Europe (ACCIE) 
are not caught in scope of Article 97 by arguing that payment by card is not a transfer of 
funds and the transaction is initiated in the moment when user presents its card to the 
merchant (and is verified at that moment). Due to the extent of use of card payments 
online, this is certainly one of the aspects of regulation which does not fully cover the real 
world needs of cyber security. Of course, the limit of online transactions amount could 
help mitigate the risk of abuse, however it is also not specified in the directive, which 
deals with banking cards in a very limited scope. Paragraph 2 specifies that the transaction 
should be authenticate using a dynamically linked elements which clearly states the spe-
cific amount and a specific payee that are taking part in the transaction. Such details are 
necessary in order to identify transactions and appropriate payees without a potential con-
fusion that could arise from a more generic forms of authentication without one-of-a-kind 
authentication details involved. Paragraph 3 only mentions that the confidentiality and 
integrity of PSU personalized security credentials should be “adequate”. 
Article 98 very briefly states the requirements expected from guidelines created 
by European Banking Authority, and how it must follow criteria given in Article 97. 
However, paragraph 2 states also additional goals expected from said guidelines, such as 
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development of user-friendly, accessible and innovative means of payment (e). More in-
formation is provided by EBA/GL/2017/17. 
 
2.6 Analysis of the directive EBA/GL/2017/17 in terms of cyber se-
curity of payment user 
As a result of article 95 of PSD2, the European Banking Authority (EBA) needs 
to develop with cooperation with European Central Bank (ECB) guidelines concerning 
the security measures for operation of payment services. Therefore, this act is comple-
mentary to PSD2 and needs to be analyzed in detail to achieve a full scope of implications 
of the second payment service directive impact on cyber security of the payment user. 
Due to a wider scope of the EBA guidelines regulations, only aspect of the cyber security 
will be evaluated and analyzed in the following section. The articles have been selected 
by their relatedness to the field of cyber security, particularly affecting the final payment 
user, therefore some irrelevant ones might have been skipped in the process. 
 Guideline 2, states the requirements regarding the governance of the payment ser-
vice providers. The establishment of effective operational and security risk management 
framework has been constituted as a necessary step. The said framework needs to be re-
vised and approved on yearly basis by management body. The most important point stated 
in this article is 2.2 point d) which talks about the requirement of establishing necessary 
procedures in order to identify, measure and manage risks related to the payment service 
providers activities. The resultant is creation of framework to deal with risk management 
of payment service operation. Moreover, in case of outsourcing, article 2.7 states that it 
is a responsibility of PSP to ensure that the outsource operations have according security 
measures in place, similar to the ones placed domestically. 
 Guideline 3, talks about the risk assessment, in the first two articles 3.1 and 3.2 
the main concern is the updating of the business functions, key roles and supporting pro-
cesses. The EBA emphasized quite extensively the need for organization of business 
structures in order to provide appropriate level of security. Moreover, as part of that or-
ganization structure, the elements of ICT systems that deals with information assets  par-
ticularly infrastructure, configuration and interconnections with other internal and exter-
nal systems should also be identified, established and regularly updated by the payment 
service providers.  
 Guideline 4 is concerned with the aspect of protection and particularly access con-
trol. Article 4.2 states the requirement of two-factor authentication, network segmentation 
and multiple-firewalls in order to provide a “defense in-depth” approach. Article 4.6 that 
during the provision of payment services, the collection, routing, processing and storing 
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of payment user data should be adequate, limited and relevant. The following article 4.7 
states the requirement for checking the possible updates for the software used in payment-
related procedures. Article 4.8 mentions the cyber security aspects from the perspective 
of physical security along with articles 4.8 to 4.13. The brief meaning of this section of 
the guidelines requires the payment service providers to maintain adequate levels of phys-
ical and logical access to the ICT systems, while emphasizing that it should only be pro-
vided to personnel requiring such provision or business requirement. This should limit 
the possibility of human factor compromising the cyber security protection measures in 
place. Elements such as roles-based access, logging and review of the systems activity 
are also mentioned to support that point along with strong authentication and anomaly 
detection systems. Particular precaution mechanism should be put in place in case of re-
mote administrative access to critical ICT components, with a very strong authentication 
put in place in order to avoid potential threats of security breaches. 
 The following Guide 5 states the requirements in term of monitoring and threat 
detection. Article 5.1 talks about the implementation of monitoring functions in order to 
detect anomalies in payment services provision. The monitoring should include all busi-
ness functions of the operations as well as supporting processes, which basically mean 
that it covers the entire business unit. Additionally, the monitoring process should be able 
to detect breaches of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information assets.  
Moreover, the protection measures regarding the software and hardware should also be 
implemented. As article 5.3 states, the detective measures should cover all publicly know 
vulnerabilities and identified information leaks, malicious code or other security threats. 
Software and hardware updates has also been given as an example of precaution measures 
for said threats. Articles 5.4 to 5.6 are concerned with security incidents reporting and 
monitoring, which also impact payment user cyber security. Starting with establishing 
criteria and appropriate thresholds for threat categorization and classification, along with 
a warning indicators system, such mechanisms should allow for early detection of opera-
tional and security incidents. Moreover, payment service providers according to the EBA 
act are obligated to establish organization processes and structures in order to provide 
consistent monitoring, handling and follow-up in case of security incidents. According to 
the act, the senior management should be informed about operational or security incidents 
through an established procedure reporting system. 
 Guideline 6 states the requirements regarding the business continuity. Although 
most points are concerned with the business aspect of consumer protection, it is still worth 
to mention some which might have cyber security implications. Article 6.1 talks about 
precaution plans and business management plans in the event of sever business disrup-
tion, which are required by the EBA. The business disruption, although unspecified could 
potentially apply for cyber security attacks and similar events. The following articles 6.2 
and 6.3 are providing requirements that needs to be fulfilled in case of emergencies that 
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might disturb critical business operation. Particularly, the banking authority requires pay-
ment service providers to implement mitigation strategies in case of termination of the 
payment services or termination of the existing contract. The main goal is to provide con-
tinues operation for the pending payment transactions already put in place. Interestingly, 
EBA in their guidelines suggest payment service providers in article 6.4 to implement 
wide range of possible emergency scenarios, including those extreme but plausible. Arti-
cle 6.5 talks about the implementation of response and recovery plans as part of the prep-
aration for the previously stated scenarios. The main focus should include: critical func-
tions, processes, systems, transactions and interdependencies. Moreover, the scenario re-
sponse plans should be adequately documented and readily accessible in the emergency 
situation to all business units. Adequate updating and improving of the plans is necessary 
on timely basis, as the threats in digital environment are constantly changing. Point 6.6 
states that the testing of said continuity plans should occur yearly. The same goes for 
frequency of updating of said plans, which according to article 6.7 should also be com-
pleted on at least yearly basis. Lastly, article 6.10 mentions the requirement for a com-
munication in case of a crisis. The payment service providers are required to have effec-
tive communication measures in place, in order to inform in a timely manner all important 
stakeholders, both internal and external as well as other external service providers de-
pendent on the operation. 
 Guideline 7 focuses on the testing of security measures. First of all, the article 7.1 
requires payment service providers to implement a testing framework for their security 
measures. The testing framework should take into consideration adoption of threats, vul-
nerabilities and other risks which have been spotted through risk-monitoring activities. 
Article 7.2 mentions the need for additional tests in case of changes in the procedures, 
changes in infrastructure or security incidents. The testing framework, according to article 
7.3 and 7.4 should include the payment terminals, other devices used for provision of 
payment services and devices that are used for authentication of the PSU. The test should 
be performed by the independent testers, in order to provide effectiveness and robustness 
of the procedures, while ensuring that the tester has sufficient skill, knowledge and ex-
pertise to execute such tests. Moreover, the personnel involved in the testing procedures 
cannot be at the same time involved in the development of testing procedures, which aims 
to reduce security risks. The requirements for such on-going tests performed by the pay-
ment service providers in terms of frequency are identical as described in the guidelines 
article 3.2, which basically mean that they have to be performed on annual basis. 
 Guidelines 8 are concerning the situational awareness and continuous learning 
mechanisms. Article 8.1 and 8.2 talk about the need for identification and constant mon-
itoring of threats that could endanger any part of operation, moreover, the later article 
requires the payment service providers to use security incidents as material for future 
improvement of their security measures. Therefore, this point can be understand as 
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consideration of key lessons based on analysis of security incidents and translating that 
into future advancement in the field of cyber security. Points 8.4 to 8.6 are considering 
the training of personnel that is working for payment service provider affected by that 
regulation. The training program should be established in order to teach staff earlier men-
tioned protocol, safety measures and requirements in terms of security of the business. 
Moreover, the EBA requires the payment service providers to ensure that the personnel 
which is occupying key roles in the business process is identified and will receive targeted 
information security training. The frequency requirement is also put in place and should 
be provided on a yearly basis or on more occasion if necessary. Lastly, the establishment 
of security awareness programs is also specified by the European banking authority, with 
an aim of easier detection of unusual activities and incidents. 
 Lastly, the guideline 9 states the relationship between the payment service user 
and payment service provider. It is important from the perspective of the cyber security 
as payment provider needs to inform the user regarding potential security risks, must pre-
sent guidance in case of security measures failure and overall provide assistance in case 
of emergency. The requirements of said are stated in the article 9.1. The following article 
states the requirement of keeping the guidance and assistance procedures up-to-date, as 
new threats and vulnerabilities are appearing. Interestingly, EBA in point 9.2 gives pay-
ment service user a permission to disable certain aspects of services that are provided by 
the payment service user, where such product functionalities exists. That could for in-
stance mean, that certain methods of payment can be disabled if the payment user wishes 
to do so and therefore have intention to increase his cyber security by that. The spending 
limits are also subject to regulation by the payment service user, and such mechanism to 
adjust them needs to be implemented by the payment service provider. This could indeed 
allow to minimize damages in face of cyber threats. The payment service user is expected 
to receive information of failed transfer or any other abnormal activity on his payment 
account, to be able to respond to the potential malicious of fraudulent behavior. As article 
9.6 says, the updates to security protocols and regulations should be clearly displayed to 
the payment user or the PSU should be informed about them through selected channels 
of communication. Lastly, as article 9.7 the regulations imposed by EBA are requiring 
payment service providers to supply payment user with information and means of contact 
in case of questions regarding observed anomalies or security concerns.  
41 
2.7 Analysis of the Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS) 
EBA/RTS/2017/02 from perspective of cyber security of pay-
ment user 
In this section, the paper will evaluate the key objectives and aspects of the Reg-
ulatory Technical Standards (RTS). The evaluation will be based on the memo issued by 
the (European Commission, 2017), which has been determined to be a comprehensive 
source of all important information regarding the directive EBA/RTS/2017/02. However, 
some supplementary information will be provided by article by (Hay, 2017). 
The main security measures stated in the RTS consist of ensuring consumer pro-
tection, competition as well as leveling playing field in a rapidly changing market envi-
ronment. Increasing the level of security of digital payments is given as one of the means 
of achieving consumer protection. The RTS is introducing set of security requirements 
which are mandatory guidelines for payment service providers, particularly in the process 
of payments or services which are payment-related. As previously stated, the service pro-
viders can include banks as well as other payment institutions. The objective of RTS is 
also to define the requirements for strong customer authentication (SCA), as well as to 
give a list of exemptions in which the providers do not need to follow this regulations. 
The regulatory technical standard is at the same time tasked with objective of brining 
more competition and fostering innovation at the retail payment market. The scope of 
RTS is identical to the scope of PSD2, which limits it to cover mainly payment accounts, 
but also newly specified payment initiation services and account information services. 
 It is important to distinguish between the applicability of each regulation, despite 
them being heavily dependable on each other. As already stated in earlier part of this 
paper, the PSD2 has started applying in all European member states as of 13 January 
2018. However, the security measures which are stated in the RTS have a different date 
of implementation which is 18 months after the core directive. This is a matter subject to 
the Council and the European Parliament, nevertheless the estimated time-frame of RTS 
applicability is September 2019. 
 One of the most important aspect in terms of security in both PSD2 as well as 
related RTS is the concept of Strong Customer Authentication (SCA). It is aiming to in-
crease the protection of electronic payments and other types of transactions i.e. online 
banking and online purchases. The requirements stated in the RTS is enforcing all pay-
ment market participants to use strong customer authentication as the basic principle of 
accessing the payment users accounts. The security aspect of SCA is based upon three 
independent elements that are known to the payment user, and identity confirmation is 
done using at least two of them. These elements consist of something that the payment 
user: 
• Know (such as a PIN code or more sophisticated password) 
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• Own (this could include a physical card, a smartphone) 
• Is (which basically translates to any type of biometrics i.e. iris scan or fingerprint) 
 
Although this is a common practice to utilize similar authentication methods in other 
types of transactions, while it comes to online purchases there are still security limitations 
applicable. Examples of standard transactions that makes use of SCA could include using 
a point-of-sale terminals in stores and confirming a card payment by typing personal PIN 
number. With only a number of exemptions, the payments by card needs to go through a 
similar security process as SCA. One of such mechanisms include 3D-Secure used by 
some card providers, which two-factor authorization proves enough to comply with SCA 
requirements imposed. Some vendors have also implemented a solution of dynamic CVV, 
however card payments are only partly falling under the scope of RTS, hence this brief 
note. 
The requirement of SCA is already applied in few European countries on basis of 
online transactions, examples include Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden. The appli-
cation of SCA for remote transactions in other European countries is purely voluntary at 
this moment. As the result of the RTS implementation of SCA, this authentication method 
is going to be mandatory for all online payments as well as accessing payment user’s 
account. Payment service provider, including banks, will be obligated to create a neces-
sary infrastructure for SCA implementation. However, for the regulations stated above, it 
is important to distinguish the liability of the bank in case of implementation of the secu-
rity measures. As the recital 14 of RTS says, “PIS Providers have the right to rely on the 
authentication procedures provided”, therefore it is to a big extent up to the bank to au-
thenticate their customer, and not the other way around. Therefore, for instance PISPs 
will be obligated to pass the control of the bank, and will not be able to implement their 
own authentication procedures in their place. Hence, the TPPs will not be able to order 
the bank to proceed with their authentication, done on their terms. 
Along with the strong customer authentication, the improvement to fraud man-
agement will have to be made. For a smooth operation, consumers and merchants will 
have to be equipped with necessary tools in order to operate in the SCA environment. 
There is a possibility of exemption from the SCA regulatory form of authentication, in 
case of security mechanism that are equally safe and secure. However, one of the require-
ments for the exemption from the SCA scheme is to provide transaction monitoring mech-
anisms that can guarantee certain low level of fraud. As a result of the SCA implementa-
tion, all payment service providers will have to conduct testing, auditing and implemen-
tation procedures that are confirming application of required security measures. Im-
portantly, in case of fraudulent payment that has been conducted, payment user will be 
entitled to a full reimbursement of the costs that could be a result of such activity. Partic-
ularly in case of online payments, additional precaution mechanism will be put in place. 
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Some of them include linking the online transaction amount with beneficiary of the pay-
ment using a generated one-time password. Thanks to this security measure, the infor-
mation that can be potentially stolen in case of hacking cannot be re-used for purposes of 
initiating another transaction. Such measures have already been implemented in Belgium, 
where the number of online frauds have drastically reduced in number. The implementa-
tion of SCA is linked with implementation of RTS regulations, therefore its introduction 
in a full scope is scheduled for September 2019. The time given between introduction of 
PSD2 and requirements listed in the RTS should allow for a smooth transition in case of 
payment service providers and particularly traditional banks. Change of security 
measures can be a delicate procedure, therefore the extended time-frame. Interestingly, 
RTS is also concerned with security of corporate payments, which are often executed in 
batches. The new regulations are considering the communication host-to-host, for exam-
ple in cases where the communication takes place between an IT system of a bank and IT 
system of a company. There are other types of authentication than SCA that are imple-
mented, however they will also be part of the certification process regulated by RTS and 
approved by national supervisors. However, this is misaligning with the concept of article 
4.1 of RTS, that states that “The authentication code shall be accepted only once.”, which 
works only in case of single payments. The assumption is that while RTS allows TPPs to 
initiate a series of payments, the original authorization code which has been applied only 
once in the process of SCA approval works for all the consequent transactions. Neverthe-
less, the provision of article 4.1 of access “only once” is not fully met. 
 Since the aspect of exemptions have been mentioned previously, it is important to 
briefly state what are the more tangible situations in which the exemptions can be applied. 
First of all, contactless card payments, despite their digital nature are exempted from the 
SCA regulation for single-transaction of a value up to 50 euro. The SCA requirement has 
also been voided in case of “trusted beneficiaries”. As comment 79 states “The exemption 
for trusted beneficiaries only applies to payment transactions made on an online account 
by the payer. The PISP cannot create a list of trusted beneficiaries.”. SCA also does not 
need to apply for low-value payments up to 30 euro with a total value of transactions set 
at 100 euro, which is aligned with the contactless card payments. Some additional ex-
emptions apply in particular cases of transport payments and parking terminals. 
The effect of SCA on e-commerce is despite negative voices forecasted to be pos-
itive. The commission is aiming to reduce the distress of implementation of SCA through 
development of trust in the system, which should foster growth of the market for digital 
payments. At the same time, the goal of the regulation is to reduce fraud affecting online 
payments.  
The RTS will also consider subject of common and secure communication. It is 
based on a framework established by a PSD2 of new third-party payment services that 
are linked to consumer payment account. The services include PISP and AISP. Therefore, 
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the RTS regulation is aiming to specify the requirements for a common and secure stand-
ard of data transfer and communication between bank and FinTechs. As a result, con-
sumer and companies will be provided with an option to grant access to their payment 
data to third party service providers (TPPs). Said TPPs can not only consist of FinTechs 
but also other banks where the data exchange can also be beneficiary for service portfolio. 
It is important to mention, that the data which is granted by the customer requires a con-
scious consent. Third-party providers, which are given access to the specific data, will be 
limited by the scope of that consent. Therefore no data outside of the given scope can be 
accessed by TPPs without prior authorization. The responsibility of the banks is to create 
a new channels of communication, that will allow TPPs to access said data. The channel 
needs to allow for a clear identification of each participant, as well as it should allow for 
a constant communication through securing messaging. It is up to the traditional banks 
how they plan to establish this communication, it can be done through existing customer 
online banking interface, but banks can also decide to create new ones. Contingency safe-
guards needs to be implemented as well, according to RTS regulations. The mechanism 
are also called “fall back mechanisms” and their purpose is to provide continuity of ser-
vice and fair market competition. 
 The RTS regulation specifies certain restriction when it comes to dedicated com-
munication interfaces. According to said directive, all communication interfaces will be 
undertaking a 3-month testing period in “prototype” conditions as well as following 3 
month “live” testing in more real world market conditions. The purpose of the test it qual-
ity assurance of interfaces which are developed by the account servicing payment service 
providers (ASPSPs) such as banks. The dedicated interface is required to provide certain 
level of availability and performance, and should be similar in that regard to interfaces 
which are offered to customers and company payment users to accessing their payment 
accounts online. Moreover, the dedicated interface should create no barriers in the provi-
sion of information to payment initiation service providers (PISPs) or account infor-
mation service providers (AISPs). RTS also requires payment service providers that are 
developing such communication interfaces to develop and define key performance indi-
cators and service level targets, in case they decide to create such solutions. The perfor-
mance indicators should be similar to those set already for online payments and banking 
platforms which are used by the final service customers. This should allow for a similar 
quality assurance as that expected from online banking services. The only exemption from 
this procedure can occur, when the payment service provider will put in place an interface 
which is fulfilling regulatory technical and its defined quality criteria of national author-
ities. The national authorities will have to consult this grant of exemption with the Euro-
pean Banking Authority (EBA). Moreover, one of the objectives of EBA is to ensure that 
the national authorities will interpret the quality of dedicated interfaces in a similar way. 
This will allow for easier supervision of their implementation in the future. The 
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regulations allow national authority to revoke previously given exemption to dedicated 
communication interface. If the interface does not operate under the criteria given by 
RTS, after two consecutive weeks of such disoperation the national authority can revoke 
the permission. The national authority is obligated to contact and inform EBA about such 
event. Additionally, the industry groups decided to create a consortium and work together 
on a common standards of interfaces. The example could include the Berlin Group. The 
European Retail Payment Board (ERPB) has established a working group in order to fa-
cilitate that process. Therefore, the ability to derive own standards is still possible, how-
ever there are going to be some standards that the payment providers can base it on. 
The protection of personal data is an issue which is addressed by PSD2 as well as 
the data protection directive also known as General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). 
Although the topic of GDPR will not be addressed in this paper, some aspects of data 
protection that are issued by RTS will be included. As previously stated, the processing 
of data requires a specific consent given by the payment service user. The payment ser-
vice providers are restricted to the data that the payment user has conceived to and that is 
necessary to provide service requested by the user. Data that has not been approved by 
the user cannot be accessed or processed. The provision of services that are accessing 
payment service user data are strictly regulated by PSD2. This could include initiating a 
payment from the payment user account, or collecting/aggregating information for pur-
poses of finance management of one or multiple payment account. The use of said ser-
vices will only be able to be provided with a request of the payment user, and an explicit 
permission needs to be given. Another aspect of security is the need of informing the 
payment service customers about the processing of their data. This should allow for a 
more transparent display of data processing events. Importantly, as the regulations are 
complementary, laws imposed by GDRP also applies for data processed under the RTS 
regulation. Hence, the user will have rights such as right to access or right to be forgotten. 
Importantly, all payment service providers which are defined by the PSD2 and RTS reg-
ulations will have to comply with GDRP regulations as well, when they process personal 
data of the payment service user. 
As the PSD2 is stating the specific circumstances and consent requirements that 
the third party providers need to receive in order to process payment user data, the new 
regulations are also specifying use of mechanisms in order to avoid “screen scraping”. 
The process of screen scraping take place through access to customer interface with the 
payment user security credentials.  Hence, the TPPs that are utilizing the technique of 
screen scrapping can access customer’s data without further identification through an of-
ficial bank channel. The new regulations are aimed to stop the ability to use this mecha-
nism, mainly to prevent unauthorized data access. Instead, the TPPs will receive an offi-
cial channel created by the banks, with accordance to the regulations specified in RTS 
and PSD2. The identification of each party will be one of the key elements of the interface, 
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making sure that secure communication can be established at all times. The proprietary 
banking interface can be re-used and adjusted to accommodate new functionality, or new 
interface can be created. The regulations specified by the RTS are providing detailed 
guidelines in terms of safeguards that the banks need to install if dedicated interface 
would be a preferred option. However, according to some market specialists (Hay, 2017), 
some of the issues of screen scraping might still remain, as the use of dedicated interface 
remind a process of screen scraping to some extent. Nevertheless, the process of signing 
the identity should provide extra security. 
During the transition period between the implementation of PSD2 and implemen-
tation of RTS regulations the banks need to focus on upgrading their payments systems 
to accommodate all of the above requirements. This will also affect the strong customer 
authentication (SCA) which has been given ground in the PSD2 directive, however more 
specific guidelines are provided only in the RTS. Therefore, the transition period will 
apply to this as well. 
2.8 The analysis of cyber security measures across all three regula-
tions 
In order to fully answer the second research question: “What changes in terms of 
cyber security does the PSD2 introduces to the payment process from perspective of 
payment user?” a comparison chart based on each regulatory act evaluated above 
needs to be created to visually display each aspect of cyber security in place. It is 
worth pointing out that due to the extent of the analysis that was provided in the 
earlier section of this work, only elements with high and medium impact on the cyber 
security of the payment user are going to be mentioned. The minor implications alt-
hough in some cases stated in the analysis do not possess sufficient value for the 
general summary. The selection has been done by assessing the implications of the 
security measures and choosing only aspects with a high or medium degree impact.   
 
Table 2 Main cyber security measrues 
Regulatory di-
rective 
Security meas-
ure 
Key security ele-
ments 
Main implication on 
security of payment 
user 
2015/2366 (PSD2) Full authorization 
to hold user funds 
Confirmation of 
the action 
Potentially lack of un-
intended fund use 
without clear consent 
of the payment user 
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2015/2366 (PSD2) Elimination of 
“blind” payments 
Before transaction 
exact amount need 
to be know 
Blocking a possibility 
of fraudulent behavior 
of certain websites and 
institutions 
2015/2366 (PSD2) Requirements of 
security measures 
of mobile devices 
Personalized cre-
dentials and two 
step authorization 
Additional level of se-
curity provided 
2015/2366 (PSD2) Eliminating possi-
bility of sharing 
credentials 
Credential secu-
rity 
Impact on account ac-
cess 
2015/2366 (PSD2) TPPs operations 
limited to those 
with clear consent 
Service awareness Less unknown sources 
of threats 
2015/2366 (PSD2) User authentica-
tion on every in-
stance of account 
access 
Confirmation of 
action of the user 
Impact on account ac-
cess 
EBA/GL/2017/17 Security frame-
work for payment 
providers 
Implication of 
procedures in case 
of risk events 
Limitation of occur-
rences that create cyber 
fraud threat and sys-
tematic error elimina-
tion 
EBA/GL/2017/17 “Defense in-
depth” 
Two factor au-
thentication, net-
work segmenta-
tion, multiple-fire-
walls 
Additional layers of 
security should impact 
general level of pay-
ment user’s confidence 
EBA/GL/2017/17 Adequate collec-
tion of data 
Limitation of data 
abuse 
Limited confidential 
data leaks 
EBA/GL/2017/17 Adequate level of 
access to ICT sys-
tems 
Human oriented 
cyber threats 
Access to account 
safety improvement 
EBA/GL/2017/17 Improved threat 
detection systems 
Limitation of 
cyber security 
breaches 
General improvement 
of security in terms of 
remote attacks 
EBA/GL/2017/17 Required software 
and hardware up-
dates 
Attack from the 
identified threats 
Improvement of safety 
unrelated to payment 
user behavior 
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EBA/GL/2017/17 Business continu-
ity regulations 
Attack which 
holds funds 
Less likely situation of 
freezing funds during 
process 
EBA/GL/2017/17 Creation of emer-
gency scenarios 
Threat response Faster resolving of 
cyber security issues in 
a systematic way 
EBA/GL/2017/17 Crisis communi-
cation 
Threat informing User can react to threat 
better when informed 
about it in the first 
place, i.e. change pass-
word 
EBA/GL/2017/17 Security measure 
testing 
Precaution mech-
anisms 
Testing of security 
measure impact di-
rectly the quality of se-
curity of end payment 
user 
EBA/GL/2017/17 Training pro-
grams and con-
stant improve-
ment based on ex-
perience 
Precaution mech-
anism 
Improvement of sys-
tems safety that is used 
by the payment user 
EBA/GL/2017/17 Assistance in case 
of threats 
Guiding mecha-
nism 
Gives users knowledge 
on responses in case of 
cyber threat encounter 
EBA/RTS/2017/02 Strong Customer 
Authentication 
(SCA) 
Authentication 
mechanism 
Allows user for a much 
stronger authentication 
while accessing ac-
count or making other 
payment-related action 
EBA/RTS/2017/02 One-time pass-
words 
Additional trans-
fer verification 
and identification 
Block the ability of a 
hacker to re-use infor-
mation extracted from 
one transaction on oth-
ers 
EBA/RTS/2017/02 Standard and se-
cure data transfer 
between payment 
institutions 
Communication 
safety 
Reduction of potential 
cyber breach in the 
scope of inter-institu-
tional communication 
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EBA/RTS/2017/02 Extended testing 
of interfaces 
Communication 
safety 
Provision of fully eval-
uated mechanism, re-
duction of errors and 
bugs 
EBA/RTS/2017/02 Additional data 
processing con-
sent 
Additional level 
of security in 
terms of authori-
zation 
Less chance for unau-
thorized behavior in 
payment services 
EBA/RTS/2017/02 Elimination of 
screen scrapping 
mechanisms 
Cleared identifi-
cation of commu-
nication channels 
Elimination of chan-
nels to commit fraud 
on user’s account 
 
 As based on the chart above, the implications in term of cyber security that are a 
resultant of PSD2 or supplementary regulatory acts is extensive. The various precaution 
mechanism, regulations and guidelines are certainly going to impact the security of pay-
ment user greatly. The scope of the regulations implemented by the directive in question 
particularly shows that previously a lot of matters remained underregulated or unspeci-
fied. Obviously, there was an element of volunteer security measures that third-party pro-
viders or other payment service providers could implement on their own, nevertheless a 
specific act that imposes such requirements upon them provides the payment user with 
higher level of trust and safety. It is important to mention that despite availability of the 
acts, one should be aware of the dates of their introduction or coming in force. As for 
PSD2 it has already been implemented in all member states, however the supplementary 
acts are still in the transition period, therefore some of the regulations at the time of writ-
ing this paper might still not come in force in some countries or institutions.  
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3 RESEARCH METHOD 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the research method used in this paper. First 
of all, the research design has been explained, with motivation for the type of research 
that has been applied as well as background information about the methods used. Follow-
ing, the data sample section evaluates the participants of the study as well as their rele-
vance to the research. Next, the data collection section introduces the methods of how the 
data has been gathered. Consequently, the explanation of the data analysis is provided. 
Lastly, the chapter finishes with conclusion and final remarks.  
3.1 Research design 
Due to the fact, that the structure of this paper is naturally divided by research 
questions asked in the introduction, the research method explaining how the specific 
questions are address has to be provided. The first two research questions that is “Which 
academic theory most accurately reflects the mechanisms and purpose in terms of cyber 
security of the second payment directive?” and “What changes in terms of cyber security 
does the PSD2 introduces to the payment process from perspective of payment user?” are 
answered with a help of literature and secondary data, whereas the answer for the last 
research question is given through an empirical study. Therefore, the first two research 
questions utilizes a method of literature synthesis to derive results. Last research question 
is answered with a help of a qualitative case study. 
The literature and secondary data regarding the purposes, mechanisms and spe-
cific information regarding the second payment service directive was extensive and easily 
accessible. The only problem consisted of scattering of information through various aca-
demic and secondary sources such as journals, official directives, expert articles and 
more. Therefore, the logical step of structuring the scattered data was to perform a litera-
ture synthesis process. 
According to (Kamiański & Szubka, 1989) literature synthesis is one of the three 
exploratory methods in science. Usually, the work with papers based on this method is 
progressing in two stages. The first consist of analysis of the collected data in order to 
distinguish the most important terms and problematic aspects of the explored topic. At 
this stage, researchers are using the analytical-comparison method. The second stage of 
the research is based on more regular form of information analysis, which goal is to es-
tablish facts, ideas and their meaning in terms of the explored topic. Within the scope of 
document analysis, one should supplement their work with internal and external analysis. 
According to (Łobocki, 2000), the internal analysis is based on exploring the content of 
the documents, appropriate understanding of said and explanation, particularly by 
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separating the first-plan contextual elements, leading thoughts and connections between 
them. Whereas, the external analysis of the documents is supplementary to the internal 
analysis. Its goal is to establish the time, conditions and environment in which the docu-
ments have been created and its influence on occurrence of certain events. The text anal-
ysis should be complemented with general synthesis process,  which provides more gen-
eral point of view of the research and explains it in a broader scope, after analysis of the 
individual elements of the data review. 
On the other hand, the third research question “What are the empirical changes in 
terms of cyber security and business practices that the banks, third party providers and 
others had experienced as a result of implementation of PSD2?” does not have sufficient 
literature conducted to provide a comprehensive review to answer the question. There-
fore, to address this issue a single case study research has been performed. (Stebbins, 
2012) states that in case of insufficient research performed on certain topic, an explorative 
case study should be made. Explorative research allows to explain certain events by 
providing answers to why, how and when specific occurrences happened. It also provides 
an option to do so by supplementing the research with different viewpoints. It is one of 
the methods to achieve deeper understanding or insight of the topic researched. The con-
struction of the research based on explorative case study aims to explain certain events 
rather than predict the outcomes. Moreover, the single case study in question is also used 
in prospective research, which means that it includes cases that are meeting certain estab-
lished criteria. Additionally, single case study is also interpretive, as the results of the 
research conducted are subjective to analysis of the researcher. The data collected is based 
on qualitative research method, which means that the data collected is non-numerical. 
As case study can include various sources such as interviews, observations and 
additional documents, it proves to be a good option to provide a comprehensive overview 
of the question researched. Nevertheless, in order to create correct questions to answer 
the research question certain preparatory steps have to be completed. According to 
(Cooper, Schindler, & Sun, 2006), literature review consist of comprehensive source of 
the overview information that can be used to formulate them. Hence, the questions created 
for purposes of this study are derived from previously conducted literature review. 
To strengthen the choice of research method, as (Yin, 1994) argues, the use of 
case study is particularly useful in terms of real-life context especially in explore complex 
matters. Research and analysis that is conducted in a descriptive manner proves a good 
method of investigating certain phenomenon.  
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3.2 Data sample 
As previously stated, the research is based on a single case study. The data that 
has been collected comes from three various sources that represent three different pay-
ment market participants – the traditional bank, third-party payment service provider and 
the legislative institution. Therefore, next the overview of the concerned organizations is 
provided. 
3.2.1 Overview of the ING 
ING as abbreviated from Internationale Nederlanden Groep is a Dutch multina-
tional bank with headquarters in Amsterdam. The business portfolio includes retail bank-
ing, direct banking, commercial banking, investment banking, asset management as well 
as insurance services. The bank boasts a high number of active customers in the range of 
37 million world-wide. As of 2017, the bank also has over 54,000 employees in different 
branches. (2017 Annual Report ING Groep N.V., n.d.) 
3.2.2 Overview of the Bank of Aruba 
The Central Bank of Aruba started its operation as of 1986, at the time of inde-
pendence of Aruba from the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Previously, Aruba has been a 
part of what is known as Netherlands Antilles. Currently, the bank is responsible for pro-
vision of the monetary policies, supervision of financial system, bank-notes issuing, gov-
ernance banking and exchange and supervision of flow of foreign payments. (“Centrale 
Bank van Aruba - CBA,” n.d.) 
3.2.3 Overview of the BlueMedia 
BlueMedia acts mainly as a payment initiation service provider with a 500 000 
daily customers for their services. They are present on the market for 20 years, however 
their current operation has shifter drastically from earlier business profile. Their yearly 
turn-over is above 9 billion PLN which is equivalent of about 2.1 billion euros. They also 
provide other highly diversified services in payments, banking, identification, insurance, 
public sector and payment systems. (“O nas - Bluemedia,” n.d.)  
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3.2.4 Interview method 
There were 3 interviews conducted in total. The interviews were done with repre-
sentatives of different payment service market participants to provide a broader picture 
of the implications that are the question of the research. The total duration of the inter-
views was 43 minutes and 49 seconds. The interviews took place between the and 22nd 
and 28th of May. Overview of the participants is provided in the following section of this 
document. The number of interviews, although limited, was able to provide sufficient 
information to analyze the implications for the parties represented and derive interesting 
conclusion.  
3.2.5 Interview participants 
Traditional banking institution: 
 
Current Product Manager at ING, with a history in the payment services. Worked closely 
in the past on the first service payment service directive, with a job related to the field of 
second payment service directive, however not directly involved in the implementation 
of latter. Currently involved in the robotics process automation for payment processes. 
 
Legislative intuition: 
 
Manager of the Information Security Department at Central Bank of Aruba and member 
of the national security task-force, with vast academic and work experience in the field 
of cyber security. Additionally, the person has been actively involved into the process of 
implementation planning of second payment service directive for purposes of Aruba.  
 
Third party service provider institution: 
 
Product manager at payment initiation service provider BlueMedia. With a relevant work 
experience regarding the implementation and development of services that were affected 
by the second payment service directive. Currently focused on works related to develop-
ment of payment gate, KIP and TPP. 
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3.2.6 Interview remarks 
As stated earlier, the interview took place in a period of one week. The transcrib-
ing of the interviews was performed right after finishing the conversation which helped 
to understand all the aspects explored in a more concise manner. All of the interviews 
have provided the research with equally valuable data and there is little in terms of dis-
crepancy between them in terms of the scope of the talks. However, the duration of some 
interviews differed slightly, due to the ability of the participants to answer the questions 
as well as their schedule arrangements. All participants have mentioned that the regula-
tions imposed by the second payment service directive had a big influence on their insti-
tutions. As can be seen in the in the analysis of the results in the later part, not all aspects 
that were asked in the interviews have yield the same degree of answers. This is assumed 
to be a reason for data vulnerability and strategic meaning of this information for their 
respective organizations.  Despite the limitation, the questions seems to provide enough 
precision for the people interviewed to understand their meaning and provide answers 
that are relevant. The background information that was provided with some of the ques-
tions also seems to be helpful during the interviews as it specifies the scope that the re-
search is trying to explore. The opening questions allowed for a better understanding if 
the person interviewed can indeed be a suitable choice for this research. The last question 
was very open-ended and allowed for more freedom of answer for the participants. All 
the participants stated that the information that is being shared can be used for this re-
search and can be used for needs of this paper. All participants also identified themselves 
as experts in the field and consisted of high-tier employees. 
3.3 Data collection 
3.3.1 Primary data 
The purpose of the case study conducted through interviews is to collect relevant 
information from payment service market participants to answer the third research ques-
tion of this paper. In order to provide sufficient answer, the impact of implementation of 
second payment service directive had to be analyzed in the scope of the entire institution, 
as well as key business operations.  The interviewees were asked all the questions that 
were part of the questionnaire. In some instances, the interview has answered the previous 
following question already through a monolog started by a previous question. In this case, 
the following question was still asked in order to gather additional data that the participant 
might have forgotten to mention. The general goal of the interviews was to answer the 
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research question from three different perspective of different payment market partici-
pants. The answers were also planned to be assessed in terms of differences and similar-
ities that the payment service directive have made on each organization. Later, the con-
clusion could be drawn as for what empirical changes the directive actually bring in the 
real-world scenario. Particularly, aspect of cyber security, business model implications, 
potential partnership and finally mandatory data-sharing was aimed to be analyzed in the 
selected institutions. The interviewer has included background information in the ques-
tion in order to narrow down the scope and guide the conversation into critical aspects. 
Therefore the questionnaire can be described as semi-structured. Some participants have 
been informed before the interviews about the scope of the talks, which resulted in po-
tential preparation of said. Particularly interview with BlueMedia has been scheduled in 
a longer run and the interviewee had confirmed that talks with PSD2 related division of 
the institution took place.  
All of the interviews had been recorded for purposes of transcription. All of the 
interviews took place through a long-distance communication that is telephone or Skype.  
3.3.2 Secondary data 
As some of the participants provided additional information after the interviews 
to supplement this research, the paper uses also some secondary data to answer the third 
research question. This data consisted mainly of internal information that is accessible 
only to the employees of said organizations. Additionally, some information have been 
sourced from publicly accessible sources to provide a broader-scope of certain topics. 
The documents were provided in English and Polish, due to the international 
scope of the interviewed institutions. The elements that have been used in Polish have 
been directly translated. The translations have been literal, as to preserve the highest 
amount of details and stay close to the original. However, due to the fact that the author 
of the paper is Polish native, the language barrier did not create any obstacles. 
3.4 Data analysis 
Two of the three interviews are conducted in English, as this is a universal lan-
guage that the participants are most comfortable with. However, due to the fact that one 
interviewed party is based in Poland, and the author of this paper is Polish for simplifica-
tion of the data gathering process the interview was conducted in Polish and later trans-
lated into English.  
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After the completion of the interviews, the entire conversations that were recorded 
have been transcribed for better analysis purposes. The transcriptions are included in the 
appendix to this paper. The transcription has been performed through an online software 
TEMI. The results of the automatic transcription were then manually checked and errors 
were corrected. The transcription process has been performed to maintain maximus de-
tails of the conversation. Certain world such used for pauses, such as “a” or “um” have 
been removed as they did not add any value and decreased the clarity. No participants 
had issues with including their interviews to the paper. Due to the limited number of 
interviews performed as well as their length, the analysis has been performed on a raw 
material provided. The analysis was performed question based, however due to the free 
nature of the conversation, some participants have mentioned elements that were related 
also to other questions stated. Therefore, the interviews should be look at as a whole rather 
than analyzed per question. 
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4 RESULTS 
In this section, the results of the interviews previously described will be analyzed. 
The structure will follow the structure of the questionnaire and therefore will be divided 
into six main concepts that are investigated in the research. The concepts include: changes 
in the security standards that are affecting final user of the payment service, implementa-
tion of the strong customer authentication, creation of new services, creation of new part-
nerships, data sharing, additional changes resulting from implementation of the second 
payment service directive. Each concept will be evaluated separately and will include 
three sub-sections based on the data collected from each of the three institutions that are 
participating in this research. Following, the results will be discussed to bring the main 
elements that have been discovered. 
4.1 Changes in security standards affecting payment service cus-
tomer 
ING: 
The expert from the ING has provided very limited information when it comes to 
the technical changes in terms of cyber security resulting from implementation of the 
second payment service directive. Elements that have been mentioned however were the 
improvement of cyber security infrastructure, nevertheless no specific examples have 
been given. Moreover, the participant have stated – “Well, the most important change for 
ING is that we are opening the account information to third party providers”  while asked 
for the aspects of cyber security. It can be assumed that by that, the area where ING is 
possible foreseeing cyber security threats can be related to this specific aspect of PSD2. 
The information about opening up those channels have been compared with the fact that 
previously said channels were exclusively available to the internal banking infrastructure. 
The fact that the information is going to flow through different digital devices, such as 
mobiles have also been mentioned. Additionally the interviewee have stated that “(…) 
we used APIs that were new to the ING and we worked a lot on making that available in 
a secure way, adhering to all the security standards, (...), that you need to apply.” Based 
on that statement, it can be concluded that APIs have enforced additional changes to the 
security aspect of operations in ING that resulted in implementation of new cyber security 
measures. 
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Bank of Aruba: 
 In terms of cyber security, the representative of the Bank of Aruba have confirmed 
that the implications coming from the PSD2 have affected all aspects that have been men-
tioned in the question. That includes changes to: IT security infrastructure, internal secu-
rity policies, security incident management procedures, contingency procedures, out-
sourcing security policies and implementations of new forms of security authorization. 
Moreover, the expert have mentioned that as a result of the implementation of PSD2 the 
cyber security measurements would also include building of a new, different infrastruc-
ture for facilitating payments. No specific technical examples have been given, however 
the perspective of this expert is providing an overview of changes that will be implement 
in the future. The situation of Aruba implies that the PSD2 policy is in the process of 
implementation and preparation that has not yet been completed. However, the range of 
changes that it take is perhaps the most broad among given institutions.  
 
 
Blue Media: 
 First and foremost, the representative of Blue Media has addressed the changes 
that the institution had to implement due to the implementation of PSD2. The expert had 
confirmed that all elements that have been mentioned in the question had indeed been 
modified in order to comply with the new regulation. Unfortunately, specific technical 
details of changes could not be provided due to the data vulnerability.  
4.2 Implementation of Strong Customer Authentication 
ING: 
The expert has declined to provide more information in regard to cyber security, 
therefore the implementation aspect of Strong Customer Authentication has to be omitted 
from perspective of the interviewee. However, thanks to the secondary data provided by 
said participant more perspective on the approach of ING can be analyzed. According to 
the documentation, the implementation of SCA for ING is an important and valuable 
regulation. Thanks to that, the cybersecurity of their customers can increase due to the 
fact that the practice of “screen scrapping” is no longer possible for the third-party pay-
ment providers, however the changes in terms of implementation have not been men-
tioned. 
 
Bank of Aruba: 
 The Bank of Aruba representative have stated that the implementation of Strong 
Customer Authentication does not lay in their field of operation. As the participant is 
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representative of the legislative side, their responsibility is to supervise such implemen-
tation in other dependent institutions. However, the expert has also stated “I can foresee 
that it will have impact on safekeeping of all these factors”, which can be taken as a 
confirmation of importance of the SCA in terms of cyber security.  
 
 
Blue Media: 
 The interviewee has stated that “It is certainly an important aspect for us, as we 
value the safety of our customers a lot.” This emphasizes the importance of this specific 
aspect of PSD2 in terms of cyber security for the analyzed institution. It is worth pointing 
out that according to the expert, the process of implementation is still on-going, that is, it 
has not been yet fully completed. Moreover, the expert had mentioned that the works on 
the SCA are in the “conceptual” stage.   
4.3 Creation of new services 
ING: 
According to the interviewee, creation of new services is an important aspect of 
their strategy and the participant have confirmed that PSD2 indeed led to creation of new 
services. The expert has said that “We are working together with the FinTechs to see how 
their solutions can be integrated with the account information that we can provide so that 
you can imagine that there will be a lot of platforms that can now really enhance services 
because they can provide more end-to-end service including banking services without the 
need to go to any kind of proprietary channel of a bank.” Therefore, some of the services 
that have been indicated here include banking platforms and solutions that are currently 
offered by the FinTechs and could be soon extended to the customers of ING. The partic-
ipant have also stated that ING intention is to be present in terms of branding on said 
platforms, therefore maintaining recognizable brand image in terms of new service de-
velopment. Interestingly, some examples of new services that were given consisted of use 
of APIs for smart speakers. Due to the opening-up of the channels, the expert showed 
interest of ING in the area of smart devices.  
 
From the secondary source documentation, the ING has stated that the development of 
the “Payconiq” payment service that operates in Belgium has been “paved” by the PSD2 
regulation, therefore it allowed for easier implementation. 
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Bank of Aruba: 
 Due to the fact that the PSD2 implementation is not a complete process in the 
situation of Aruba, the impact on provision of new services is hard to assess. However, 
the interviewee has mentioned that “indeed a new payment service providers would want 
to join in”, therefore indicating that an increase of competition on the payment market in 
Aruba is expected to increase. Some examples of FinTech companies have also been 
given, such as Google and Facebook. 
 
Blue Media: 
 The answer provided by the interviewee was very brief, however it encapsulated 
the result the overall impact of PSD2 on this aspect. The interviewee has confirmed that 
indeed the introduction of PSD2 had stimulated creation of new services in terms of ac-
count information services and payment initiation services. There were no specific exam-
ples provided though. Moreover, the interviewee had stated that the institution is currently 
working on new services that are adjusted to the changes for after 14th of September (RTS 
implementation deadline). 
4.4 Creation of new partnerships 
ING 
The expert has explicitly stated that “So we are also working together with these major 
players and that's all now becoming possible because of this standardized way of working 
and because of PSD2”. Therefore it can be confirmed that the impact of PSD2 has indeed 
positively affected the creation of new partnerships. In case of most services that were 
indicated in the previous section, the element of partnership was mentioned as well. More-
over, on several occasion the participant has mentioned the new possibility of information 
exchange with other banks and third party providers. The participant has also mentioned 
the willingness of ING to be a part of more collaborative market platforms, and example 
given consisted of mortgage comparison platform. The representative of ING has also 
addressed concerns from the new market situation which is a potential lack of identity on 
the payment market.  
 
Bank of Aruba 
 The interviewee has confirmed that the implementation of PSD2 is expected to 
create new partnerships in the payment market of Aruba. Nevertheless, the implementa-
tion of this regulatory act is not given as the only impact that might stimulate that event, 
rather the implementation of new payment rails that is undertaken in the nation of Aruba. 
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Blue Media 
 In case of creation of new partnership relationships, the interviewee had indeed 
confirmed the impact of PSD2 in this aspect. The partnership creation had been pointed 
at the account information services in particular and an example of telecom companies 
had been provided. Another example had consisted of partnership with another Polish 
PISP “PayU”, however the details of the scope of partnership had not been disclosed. 
4.5 Data sharing 
ING 
Data sharing has been extensively mentioned throughout the interview. On several 
occasions the interviewee have stated that it is a very important measure for ING. The 
interviewee have mentioned that ING is in the process of development of APIs based on 
the regulations imposed by PSD2. The participant have also addressed that the idea of 
Open Banking goes beyond payment services and ING would like to utilize those oppor-
tunities that come with it. 
 
Bank of Aruba 
 In case of data sharing, the interviewee has stated that the represented institution 
would most likely be implementing new forms of APIs, that are potentially developed 
specifically for their purpose. Moreover, the security aspect of data sharing has also been 
addressed. The example given was concerning untrusted third-party providers and the 
responsibility of the bank to maintain data safety. Hence, the expert has identified an issue 
that data sharing technology might still require additional cyber security measures that 
the traditional banks would need to implement in order to prevent other untrusted organ-
ization to gain access to them through data sharing. The aspect of data privacy law in 
Europe (GDRP) has also been given as despite being limited to Europe it does effect 
European citizens world-wide. Therefore, the institutions in Aruba as historically related 
to Europe would need to consider this aspect as well. 
 
Blue Media 
 The development of APIs had been indicated as important. The interviewee had 
stated that the company is “currently working on quite intensively” on this aspect of reg-
ulations. Moreover, the expert has stated that the use of APIs would include those issued 
by the traditional banks as well as development in their own solutions.  
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4.6 Additional changes resulting from implementation of the PSD2 
ING 
The implications that have been stated by the ING representative includes the fi-
nancial impact that are resultant of implementation of all measures related to PSD2. The 
statement was rather general, but it would imply that the highest costs would be associated 
with development of new channels, assuming forms of APIs and others. The interviewee 
has also stated that the general banking environment is going to drastically change, par-
ticularly in the form of providing services to the banking customers. The expert have also 
mentioned “(…) much less, (…) proprietary environment”, that is the traditional banking 
brick and mortar market share. Instead, it was suggested that the banking industry will 
shift towards much more open environment, where the emphasize will be put on the actual 
service and development of new services rather than the front-end. The future of ING has 
been indicated to go towards the idea of a platform that is collection of different services 
where PSD2 is one of the stimulants that encourages this approach. 
 
Bank of Aruba 
 The main aspect that has been additionally mentioned by the expert of Bank of 
Aruba is addressing the idea of a Sandbox. The purpose would be to be able to observe 
their operation in a controlled environment that allows for adjustment of regulations and 
security measures. Particularly, the third-party providers and new ventures have been 
stated as for the use of such Sandbox. Interestingly, another important security aspect 
have been mentioned in the last part of the interview. The interviewee has stated “Also 
from a technical perspective, what are these people, offering to the user? Where is the 
user data? Is there enough transparency for the end user as to where his data is? And also 
something that's also very tricky in case of a breach who is responsible for what (…) so 
where does the responsibility end and the other starts, because I think, the bank can also 
have a say in this.” This aspect is particularly interesting, as in terms of changes of regu-
lations, the PSD2 does indeed specify a lot of said security concerns. Therefore it can be 
assumed that the use of Sandbox and evaluation of service providers can be beneficial for 
implementation and changes that the PSD2 brings in terms of cyber security. 
 
Blue Media 
 Additional changes that have been a result of implementation of PSD2 were con-
firmed. Examples given by the interviewee includes development of new business strat-
egies. Moreover, the expert has stated “generally we perceive PSD2 as sort of the incu-
bator for changes that might come,” The impact of said regulation had also been described 
as major. It has also been stated that the evaluated institution is “looking for opportunities 
and threats and try to respond to them accordingly”. This can also be linked with cyber 
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security threats that could be perceived by such payment market participants, however no 
definite statements as such have been made. 
4.7 Result discussion 
The purpose of this section is to describe the results implications and how they 
address the research question stated. Due to the lack of literature that could allow for 
comparison of the results with other studies conducted, the discussion will focus purely 
on context of the research on the scope of this paper. 
The research question that the study was trying to address was What are the em-
pirical changes in terms of cyber security and business practices that the banks, third party 
providers and others had experienced as a result of implementation of PSD2?”. As can be 
observed, the scope of the research question did not limit the investigation to only the 
aspect of cyber security in terms of the PSD2 regulation. Moreover, it extended to show 
other empirical implications that could go along the changes of cyber security measures 
with the intention to observe the link between them. 
Hence, the analysis of the results allowed for statement that the aspect of cyber 
security indeed plays a crucial role for all of the studied institutions. Nevertheless, the 
specific implications of that impact were hard to observe on the results provided earlier. 
The discrepancy between the institutions was quite clear, all of the three institutions are 
at the same time representatives of different payment market participants showed very far 
going differences in approach, plans and experiences related to the second payment ser-
vice directive. Moreover, it is worth pointing out that the institutions were all in different 
stages of implementing said regulations and could provide very diversified opinions about 
them. In terms of cyber security, the results also varied in terms of the knowledge of 
participants and their involvement in implementation of said. The detailed technical 
changes that were expected to be observed turned out to be extremely hard to obtain, 
mainly due to the fact that such data can be described as vulnerable for business operation 
of investigated organizations, as well as limited willingness of participants to elaborate 
more in this aspect. However, all of the interviewees showed a high willingness to share 
information about future plans, growth, development of new services and other aspects 
that could be described as more general. 
The research however can make some general brief answers to the questions 
asked. First of all, the impact of the payment service directive on the cyber security of the 
payment user can be described as significant and far going. All of the researched organi-
zations basically could confirm that statement. Moreover, in terms of SCA, Bank of 
Aruba and Blue Media indeed confirmed the importance of that measure for cyber secu-
rity of the payment user and for their operation. The implications of PSD2 on additional 
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aspects such as development of new services, business relations can also be described as 
existent and rather significant. Lastly, the data sharing has collected interesting results as 
one hand it has been observed to be a very important aspect of the PSD2 from empirical 
perspective of the organizations research, but also has been identified as a potential threat 
in terms of cyber security. Therefore, the implication of data sharing could be further 
studied to see what are those implications and potential threats. 
Based on the results, it is very hard to make general statements in case of different 
institutions in order to apply this research on a wider scope of the payment market partic-
ipants. However, the results still turned out to be rather interesting and could possess a 
value from business perspective. 
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5 CONCLUSION 
5.1 Main findings 
The main findings include answers to the three research questions stated in the 
beginning of the paper, as well as, the problem statement. 
 First of all, the first research question was trying to present the theory that could 
explain the purpose of the second payment service directive from the perspective of the 
payment user. Therefore, in the result of the study a Technology Threat Avoidance The-
ory (TTAT) has been derived as the most suitable choice to explain the underlying pur-
poses of the directive in question. It has been observed as presenting very interesting 
perspective on a second payment service directive, as a result of the study, it has been 
concluded that the theory could prove useful not only in explanation of the purposes but 
also in future development of similar regulatory acts. 
 Secondly, the study aimed to answer the research question concerning the changes 
that the second payment service directive, as well as supplementary policies, have brought 
in terms of cyber security to the payment service user. It can be concluded that the changes 
were severe. As a result of the analysis of three very extensive regulatory acts have been 
presented in a form of a table containing the most important implications (according to 
the author). Overall, thanks to the implementation of said regulatory acts, safety of the 
payment services user has drastically improved and will further improve as some acts are 
still pending and will be mandatory for service providers in the near future. 
 Thirdly, the research question was attempting to address the empirical implica-
tions that the second payment service directive had on payment service users in terms of 
cyber security, and provide additional information about the impact on other aspects of 
analyzed institutions. Concluding, the cyber security aspect of the payment service di-
rective on payment users has been established to be significant. Moreover, all of the in-
stitutions have stated that the changes that the PSD2 is bringing in terms of cyber security 
are important. Additionally, the changes from previous policies to the ones imposed by 
PSD2 in terms of cyber security according to two out of three institutions have included 
all of the aspects mentioned in the questionnaire that is: IT security infrastructure, internal 
security policies, security incident management procedures, contingency procedures, out-
sourcing policies and implementation of new form of authentication. Moreover, the as-
pect of Strong Customer Authentication (SCA), which has been previously established to 
be one of the key objectives of the PSD2 regulation in terms of cyber security improve-
ment also turned out to be significant in perspective of the studied institutions. Two out 
of three organizations have also mentioned that they will have to introduces changes to 
some aspects of security measures in order to comply with said safety mechanism. 
66 
Interesting observations have also been observed in other aspects of payment service pro-
viders business other than cybersecurity. The introduction of PSD2 has led to introduction 
of new services in all three studied organizations or dependent entities. Particularly inter-
esting was the impact of PSD2 on development and importance of FinTechs which has 
also been mentioned by two of three institutions directly, as one could be assigned as 
FinTech by itself. Introduction of PSD2 has led to creation of new partnerships also for 
all studied organizations, or in case of Bank of Aruba its almost certainly going to create 
new partnerships in the future. Data sharing has been identified as one of the most im-
portant aspects of PSD2, particularly by traditional bank representative, however all par-
ticipants have confirmed its importance. Data sharing has also been perceived as a poten-
tial threat, again mainly by the traditional bank representative. Additional remarks that 
were given at the end of the study include use of Sandbox environment to test new pay-
ment market participants, positive impact of PSD2 on business development and indica-
tion of drastic changes to the banking environment in general which result from imple-
mentation of second payment service directive. 
5.2 Research Validity 
In order to validate the research, the four different aspects of the qualitative 
method used are going to be evaluated as according to (Guba, 1981). These aspects in-
clude: credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability.  
 The purpose of credibility is to check if the results obtained are believable. The 
use of a standard questionnaire for each interviewed participant is believed to increase 
said aspect. Moreover, the interviews conducted have been transcribed and the provided 
in the appendix to this paper. The translation of one of three interviews that had been 
conducted in Polish rather than English has been done by the author of this paper who is 
a native of Polish language, therefore the translation should maintain high level of original 
information provided. 
 The second aspect of research validity, that is transferability will be discussed 
next. The meaning of this aspect is how the results derived in this research can be applied 
in different context. As the representatives of the participants were providing information 
from perspective of the entire organization the transferability has certainly increased. 
Some of the data collected can also be used on evaluation of wider impact of PSD2 rather 
than only the perspective of cyber security. 
The third aspect is dependability, which explains the ability to replicate the study 
on while conducting similar research. In this paper, the study has been conducted on three 
very diverse institutions which will be indeed hard to transfer to other context. Moreover, 
the time frame of this research, that is after the implementation of PSD2, however before 
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the deadline for certain supplementary regulations also proves a unique perspective of 
this research. Nevertheless, dependability has been increased by providing of detailed 
methodology and participant introduction which therefore allows for creation of similar 
study. More to that, the data collected in this study is believed to be useful to complement 
data collected on different organizations through similar study. 
Lastly, confirmability explains the degree of the influence that outside parties had 
on the results of this study. The interviewees were not related by any means, therefore is 
no possibility for any communication. The interviews were also recorded and transcribed 
which creates a hard evidence. Any other aspects of work on this paper by outside party 
has been determined to be minimal to not say non-existent. 
5.3 Limitations and future study recommendations 
The research has number of limitations that need to be addressed. To start, the 
first research question method of literature analysis is based on 27 academic sources, 
which do not represent the entire scope of the research papers that are available in selected 
journals. In order to provide a more comprehensive analysis, one should conduct a 
broader study to include the remaining literature, the selection process could also include 
more factors that could provide easier comparison of the theories rather than concluding 
the research on literature review.  
 The second research question that was answered with a help of literature synthesis 
also need to clarify certain limitations in the process. Beginning with the scope of litera-
ture synthesis, the number of academic sources is limited due to recent character of the 
regulation in question. Therefore, the synthesis had to include sources from less reliable 
websites, rather than focus purely on academic papers. Therefore, some aspects could 
suffer on quality of data that it was based on. Moreover, the analysis of the regulations 
due to its size proved to be very time consuming and difficult task. As only one author 
has worked on it, certain elements of cyber security regulations that were researched using 
said regulatory acts could be omitted. 
 The third research question was answered by a single case study based on quali-
tative research method. The most significant limitation included the scope of the research, 
three institutions that were evaluated cannot represent the entire payment service market 
properly and can hardly scale within their own type of organization. Moreover, each in-
stitution had only one expert interviewed which added the limitation in that regard. The 
questionnaire, due to limited number of participants in the study could not be adjusted 
through a pilot study on benchmark market participant. Some of the aspects that have 
been asked in the study were not fully implemented in participating institutions. 
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Moreover, the interviewees had a tendency to avoid answering the questions with a con-
crete examples, despite being asked to provide such.   
 Despite interesting data gathered, it would certainly be beneficial for the study to 
have a higher number of interviews and to increase the scope of the participating organi-
zations. In order to provide a cleared formulation of the questionnaire, a pilot study on a 
benchmark participant could be performed as well. It would be interesting to see the re-
sults after implementation of all the supplementary regulations to PSD2, which are com-
ing to power in the near future. Certainly, the data gathered could include much more 
“delicate” information if the study would be conducted by someone working within one 
of the organizations affected by implementation of PSD2. Lastly, over time more litera-
ture on the topic could become available, therefore providing a better comparison material 
to aid this research. 
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6 MANAGEMENT SUMMARY 
The second payment service directive has broad impact on many aspects of cyber 
security, operation of third-party service payment providers, traditional banks and last but 
not least payment service users. Despite vast literature, documentation and publicly avail-
able regulatory acts, the information regarding its purpose, impact on cyber-security of 
the payment user as well as empirical implications on the stakeholders of the second pay-
ment service directive is limited. Therefore, this paper provides interesting observations 
and comprehensive answers to all of the previously stated issues. An overview of the 
research questions as well as the main finding has been provided in the table below.  
 
Table 3 Management summary 
Research Question Research Method Main findings 
RQ1: Which academic the-
ory most accurately reflects 
the mechanisms and pur-
pose in terms of cyber se-
curity of the second pay-
ment directive? 
Literature review based on 
27 academic papers. 
The selection of Technol-
ogy Threat Avoidance The-
ory (TTAT) as the most in-
teresting and suitable the-
ory to explain the underly-
ing purposes of the PSD2. 
RQ2: What changes in 
terms of cyber security 
does the PSD2 introduces 
to the payment process 
from perspective of pay-
ment user? 
Literature synthesis based 
on extensive literature re-
view, including many arti-
cles, internet sources, aca-
demic papers as well as 
three regulatory acts 
(2015/2366 (PSD2), 
EBA/GL/2017/17, 
EBA/RTS/2017/02) 
The impact of the PSD2 as 
well as supplementary acts 
is significant on the secu-
rity of the payment service 
user and among many other 
implications resulting from 
their implementation there 
is also number of cyber se-
curity measures affecting 
payment user introduced. 
RQ3: What are the empiri-
cal changes in terms of 
cyber security and business 
practices that the banks, 
third party providers and 
others had experienced as a 
result of implementation of 
PSD2? 
Single case study based on 
three diversified stakehold-
ers of the PSD2, which in-
cludes a traditional bank, 
third-party service provider 
(PISP) and legislator. 
The results showed that the 
institutions did implement 
changes or will implement 
changes related to cyber se-
curity measures as a result 
of PSD2 and that the said 
regulation also impacted 
other areas of their opera-
tions. 
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APPENDIX 
6.1 Questionnaire 
 
OPENING QUESTIONS: 
1. What is your role in the financial sector? Are you a representative of payment service 
provider (bank, third-party provider), payment user or legislator? Could you briefly 
describe what do you do? 
 
2. Are you familiar with Second Payment Service Directive? If yes please describe 
briefly what was the scope of your work with PSD2. 
 
CORE QUESTIONS: 
1. Payments and access to the account safety is emphasized as one of the key objectives 
of the second payment directive (PSD2). As a result of its implementation, did your 
organization introduce any changes to existing security standards affecting final users 
of your services? If yes which ones? (Examples could include IT security infrastruc-
ture, internal security policies, security incident management procedure, contingency 
procedures, new forms of security authorization) 
 
2. One of the key objectives of PSD2 is to increase level of security and confidence of 
electronic payments. It requires payment service providers such as banks to develop 
strong customer authentication (SCA) which combine at least two independent ele-
ments - physical such as card or mobile phone, knowledge (passwords) or biometric 
feature, such as fingerprint before making a payment. Have your organization had to 
implement, update or modify in any other way existing security solution in order to 
comply with PSD2 regulation? If yes, could you briefly describe what was the scope 
of the change? 
 
3. PSD2 led to increased competition on the financial market. New players knows as 
Third-party providers have emerged to compete with traditional banks. Therefore, 
have your organization developed any kind of new services which were a resultant of 
the new market situation? This could include new forms of payments, mobile apps, 
forms of authorization etc.  
 
4. Third-party providers do not necessarily need to consist of competitors and in many 
cases can supplement the offer of traditional bank. Have your organization created 
new partnerships or implemented services of third-party providers that could be a re-
sult of implementation of PSD2 directive?  
 
5. PSD2 also enforces the data sharing between the banks and third-party providers, it 
is done mainly through Application Programming Interface (API). What were the 
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implications of this data sharing law on your organization? Does your organization 
utilizes existing API (i.e. Open Banking) or developed their own? 
 
6. Are there any other changes or practical implications that your organization has un-
dertaken which were a result from implementation of PSD2? Could you briefly state 
them? 
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6.2 List of analyzed articles 
 
Table 4 Overview of academic papers 
Journal Title Theory Context 
MISQ Avoidance of Information Technol-
ogy Threats: A Theoretical Per-
spective 
TTAT [ p. 72] Malicious vs Virtuous IT 
[p. 73], Cybernetic Theory [p 73] Copy-
ing theory, process theory, variance the-
ory. 
 
What stimulates user to undertake safeguarding measures, realize 
threat, avoidance and adoption in face of cyber security. User motiva-
tion. 
 
MISQ CyberGate: A Design Framework 
and System for Text Analysis of 
Computer-Mediated Communica-
tion 
N/A 
 
In-depth explanation of what it takes to analyze CMC and how it was 
done by the authors. 
 
MISQ Brand Positioning Strategy Using 
Search Engine Marketing 
N/A Study of web search engines and its effect on consumer behaviour, 
the study showed number of factors that have been influenced by 
change in website positioning. 
MISQ Cybercrime Deterrence and Inter-
national Legislation: Evidence 
from Distributed Denial of Service 
Attacks 
General deterrence theory (GDT), Rou-
tine Activity Theory (RAT) 
Evaluation of hackers behavior in case of COC 
 
MISQ Circuits of Power: A Study of Man-
dated Compliance to an Infor-
mation Systems Security De Jure 
Standard in a Government Organi-
zation 
N/A The paper tests few hypothesis related to adoption of ISS mainly in 
case of gov. Agencies 
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MISQ Practicing Safe Computing: A Mul-
timedia Empirical Examination of 
Home Computer User Security Be-
havioral Intentions 
Protection motivation theory (PMT) [p. 
617] 
The perspective of human factor in a form of home computer users in 
terms of cyber security. How they make the weakest point in cyber 
defense. 
CAIS An Empirical Examination of IT-
Enabled Emergency Response: The 
Cases of Hurricane Katrina and 
Hurricane Rita 
N/A The value of response, how to response to a threat. In the context of 
hurricane threat. Information systems used for threat response. 
CAIS Digital Steganography—An Intro-
duction to Techniques and Tools 
N/A How different forms of stenography and more importantly data injec-
tions can be used also in cyber-attacks. Mechanism are audio files, 
image files, video files and other. 
  
CAIS Information Systems and Health 
Care XIII: Examining the Critical 
Requirements, Design Approaches 
and Evaluation Methods for a Pub-
lic Health Emergency Response 
System 
N/A Emergency Response system, similar to later Chen article. 
CAIS Examining Inefficiencies and Con-
sumer Uncertainty in E-Commerce 
 
Economics of Information Theory and 
Transaction Cost Theory. [p. 527]  
Uncertainties’ with online shopping. Cyber security as one of the is-
sues of e-commerce [p. 528] Digital vs real world, many compari-
sons. 
CAIS Country-Level Determinants of E-
Government Maturity 
N/A Factors for development of e-governance, factors of measuring the 
maturity etc. 
CAIS Multiple Indicators and Multiple 
Causes (MIMIC) Models as a 
Mixed-Modeling Technique: A Tu-
torial and an Annotated Example 
 
PBM Model Highly scientific comparison of MIMIC models 
CAIS Unveiling the Mask of Phishing: 
Threats, Preventive Measures, and 
Responsibilities 
N/A Phishing, especially in banking. Bogus websites, Trojans, Web-based 
delivery, Pharming - many more listed around p. 549 
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CAIS A Knowledge Management Ap-
proach to Identify Victims of Hu-
man Sex Trafficking 
System development method [p. 608] Use of socials for human trafficking (luring), mainly with a use of 
ads. 
JAIS Preventing State-Led Cyberattacks 
Using the Bright Internet and Inter-
net Peace Principles 
N/A Bright Internet initiative; 
 
JAIS Jump-Starting the Internet Revolu-
tion: How Structural Conducive-
ness and Global Connections Help 
Diffuse the Internet 
N/A Empirical examination of the influence of globalization on Internet 
capacity/development 
JAIS The Centrality of Awareness in the 
Formation of User Behavioral In-
tention toward Protective Infor-
mation Technologies 
User technology acceptance model, the-
ory of planned behavior 
Analysis of motivation to prevent cyber-attacks of computer users. 
JAIS Understanding Security Behaviors 
in Personal Computer Usage: A 
Threat Avoidance Perspective 
Technology Threat Avoidance Theory [p. 
395 and more 396]  
How malicious software motivates user to avoid IT Threats. 
JAIS ICT Challenges and Opportunities 
in Building a “Bright Society” 
N/A Focused mainly on cyberbullying, some other elements of ICT issues 
also are given. 
JAIS Robbing Peter to Pay Paul: Surren-
dering Privacy for Security’s Sake 
in an Identity Ecosystem 
N/A The article talks about trade-off of privacy and security on example of 
specific identity ecosystems. 
JAIS A Lifetime of Theory and Action 
on the Ethical Use of Computers: A 
Dialogue with Enid Mumford 
N/A Case studies regarding 4 principles presented in a form of interview 
with Enid Muford. 
HICSS Perverse Effects in Defense of 
Computer Systems: When More Is 
Less 
N/A The article shows many situations where perverse effect occurs - 
technological, cyber defense, human etc. 
EIJS 
 
Dispositional and situational fac-
tors: influences on information se-
curity policy violations 
N/A How likely it is to violate security measures by users.  
EJIS Third-degree conflicts: information 
warfare  
N/A Background information on information warfare and comparison with 
other types of physical warfare. 
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EIJS If someone is watching, I'll do what 
I'm asked: mandatoriness, control, 
and information security  
N/A How organizations motivate individuals to take precautions in ac-
cordance with security measures enforced. 
DA Information Security Investment 
When Hackers Disseminate 
Knowledge 
N/A Differential game framework; 
DA Exploitation of Ambiguous Cues to 
Infer Terrorist Activity 
N/A The article present a model on hypothetical scenario of nuclear terror-
ist attack and its implications. 
6.3 Interview 1 Transcript - ING 
 
Interviewer: 01:07 The first question is, what is your role in the financial sector, are you a representative of payment service provider such 
as bank, third-party payment provider, payment user or legislator. Could you briefly describe what do you do? 
ING: 01:37 I'm a product manager at ING, which is a bank, which is quite famous worldwide and we also engage a lot with the third 
parties. And I've gotten history in payments, but lately I am doing something else. So that might also complicate, that it 
will be, maybe it will be hard for me to answer all your questions, but I used to be very heavily involved in a payment 
sector, but lately I'm doing robotics process automation also for payment processes. So yeah, that's my role. 
Interviewer: 02:22 Okay, perfect. Well, are you familiar with the second payment service directive? And if you are, then could you please 
describe briefly what was the scope of your work with the PSD2? 
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ING: 02:38 Yeah, I worked on the predecessors, the euro back in the days with SEPA, with the PSD1 and for PSD2, I'm not really 
heavily involved. I'm familiar with Open Banking a little bit and how we are trying to organize ourselves within ING to 
be prepared for the PSD2 a as a bank. 
Interviewer: 03:15 Okay, perfect. Well most of my questions are PSD2 related so I would still appreciate if you just answer to the best of 
your knowledge and that's absolutely fine. Let's move on with the core questions then. So as you know, payment and 
access to the account safety is emphasized as one of the key objectives of the second payment service directive. And as 
a result of its implementation, did your organization introduce any changes to existing security standards affecting final 
user of the service? And, if yes, which ones? I can give you some of the examples as well to guide the question. And 
those examples could include: IT security infrastructure, internal security policies, security incident management proce-
dures, contingency procedures, new forms of security authorization. 
ING: 04:21 Well, the most important change for ING is that we are opening the account information to third party providers, so 
until now, we have our own channels and information about accounts was restricted to our own channels for Internet 
brunches, mobile. As of now we are opening this to third party provider. So that's the most important change for us. 
That we need to provide an API for other parties, also other banks, but also, to other providers to make it the most of all 
to share account information that until now was really only within our own system. So that means that we used APIs 
that were new to the ING and we worked a lot on making that available in a secure way, adhering to all the security 
standards, that you need to, that you need to apply. On the other hand, we are also of course, seeing the opportunities for 
PSD2 that we can also start providing account information from other banks to our customers. So the multi-thing princi-
ple now becomes much easier to provide to our customers, being at the retail and wholesale. So yeah, we, we did a lot 
on our infrastructure and also on the security. I don't have all the details, but indeed, we need to provide the PSD2 APIs. 
That was the most important change for us. And on the other hand, we are also going to use third party or other banks 
APIs to also provide this to our customers. 
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Interviewer: 06:28 Is there anything else that, you know, about the security aspect that has been changed, in terms of PSD2? Basically, do 
you have a knowledge of any, any changes when it comes to security that has been implemented because of the PSD2? 
ING: 07:04 No, I'm afraid I don't have that knowledge. No. 
Interviewer: 07:07 Okay. That's all right . Let's move to the question number three then. PSD2 led to increased competition on the financial 
market and new players known as the Third party provides have emerged to compete with traditional banks. Therefore, 
have your organization developed any kind of new services which were a result of the new market situation? This could 
include new forms of payments and mobile apps, forms of authorization. 
ING: 07:47 Yes, we did. We are working together with the FinTechs to see how their solutions can be integrated with the account 
information that we can provide so that you can imagine that there will be a lot of platforms that can now really en-
hanced services because they can provide more end to end service including banking services without the need to go to 
any kind of proprietary channel of a bank. So we are looking together with FinTechs to see how can we deliver the 
services, because of course you can imagine that our concern is that in the end this account information will be fully out 
of our hands. And the window to the customer, will then belong to another party like a Google or Amazon or Apple. 
And, and we are only becoming a factory without a face to the customer. So that's why we are trying to make sure that 
we will be there with our own branding and our own products in this portals that people go to. We also on the other 
hand, we like to extend our service, not only with account information and payment information, but also services added 
on top of that. So also there we are reaching out to FinTechs and hopefully we can also create these kinds of portals and 
platforms where people will go to. And, for instance we create this API, and yeah, we cannot really afford, ignore the 
power of these big companies like Amazon and Google. So we are also, connecting our PSD2 APIs with for instance 
smart speakers. So we would like to be available via Google Home or Amazon Echo so that a customer can ask for his 
balance just by sitting on the kitchen table and asking Google what the balance is. So we are also working together with 
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these major players and that's all now becoming possible because of this standardized way of working and because of 
PSD2. 
Interviewer: 10:16 Okay, great. That's very useful answer. That basically answers also my, another question which was if there are any 
partnerships created thanks to the third party providers integration which is a result of PSD2. So you've already men-
tioned the, the Amazon and Google and Apple. So this one side. Do you have any other examples on mind perhaps? 
ING: 10:52 Yeah, I think we are also dealing with these platforms. So, I do not have the concrete examples, but for instance, if you 
would create a kind of mortgage comparison platform, and ING would also have stake in there, we would then be able 
not only to add our own PSD2 information, but also again, account information from other banks available in that portal 
and then, you can still have an ING endorsed solution can then be made available. So, I mean we are, it's again the same 
thing that we would not only like to be only providing our information. But we would also like to benefit from the open 
market that you will now see by teaming up with these kind of platform initiatives for their mortgage comparisons or 
instant loans. For instance, that you would be able to provide the loan to a consumer by also just checking in real-time 
the dependence that he has with another thing. Those are things that were impossible before PSD2 and are now becom-
ing available. 
Interviewer: 12:08 Okay. I think that answers my question pretty well. Two more questions I've got. First of all, well you've already men-
tioned open banking as one of the API that ING is utilizing is the only one that? Well, is ING, your organization partici-
pating in development of the Open Banking API or is it developing their own? Could you elaborate a little bit on that? 
ING: 12:45 We are building our own PSD2 APIs, so our own development. We are extending the scope like open banking, so it's 
not only PSD2. So not only payments related, APIs that we are building, but we're also trying to put together more APIs 
that in the end can be opened for our customers. So it's open banking is more than and payments and we are, I think also 
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developing our own standards, not our own ones. But we are developing our own KPIs there as well. But I don't have a 
lot of detailed information about that, I'm afraid. 
Interviewer: 13:35 Okay. Well, the last question would be very open ended. We've talked about some elements such as the APIs, such as 
the other implications of basically opening up the format of the banking and sharing the information. Are there any 
other changes or practical implications that you have observed in your organization that are a result of the PSD2 imple-
mentation? Could you briefly state them? 
ING: 14:11 I think this will change the way that we are now serving our customers because we have invested a lot in these different 
channels and every bank has invested a lot in different channels. It's costing millions of euros of a development and 
maintenance. And I think what you will see in the next years, and we are already starting to prepare for that. That we 
will have much less, I think this proprietary environment where customers will go, we will have much more open envi-
ronment where customers will go to and that will mean that we will not invest more in the frond-end but in creating this 
services and also using these services. So I think that that is going to be the main thing for the future. And that's why 
ING is also trying to become a portal, a proprietary platform that a lot of people go to, or at least be part of the platform 
where people go and that's the big change and we will invest less in our own channels and we will invest more in this 
platform idea and I think PSD2 the most concrete example right now. 
Interviewer: 15:31 Okay, great. I think that's all I basically need in terms of the implications of PSD2 in your organization. 
ING: 15:45 What I could do is I can check on our intranet for more PSD2 related information. And if I get some interesting stuff 
that's really answering your questions in a more detailed way. I will share this to you this afternoon. Maybe I can help 
you a little bit more with some more specific information. Let's see what I can find. 
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Interviewer: 16:12 That will be absolutely great and obviously I appreciate that help a lot. Especially if you can get some information in 
terms of a cyber security that is particularly useful for my research. And, I do understand that this is a very, very vulner-
able data that, well it's very a well a well that you cannot really say any specific information obviously, I would very 
much be interested, especially in information which would be basically what was the cyber security implication of 
PSD2, meaning it does not have to be exact solution or our cyber security measure. 
ING: 17:12 I will, I will see what I can find. But of course you have to imagine that our channels were of course, kind of for Fort 
Knox kind of. Yeah. Nobody could get it of course. And now we are opening. So, so we are, we need to defend our data 
and our apartments in another way. But yeah, if you ask me specific what we did, I would try to rectify. 
6.4 Interview 2 Transcript – Bank of Aruba 
 
Interviewer: 01:04 Well let's start with the opening question then. What is your role in the financial sector? Are you representative of pay-
ment service provider such as bank, third party provider or legislator? And could you briefly describe what do you do? 
Bank of Aruba: 01:20 So basically, I have two functions. So a legislator definitely and we do a lot of supervision and also in the payments 
infrastructure for the financial sector as well. 
Interviewer: 01:41 Okay, perfect. Well another question, are you familiar with second payment services directive? If yes, please describe 
briefly what was the scope of your work with PSD2? 
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Bank of Aruba: 01:53 So yes, I am currently for our domain. I'm in the group that is presenting a version of the PSD2, for our, our nation or 
our island in this case. So I am pretty much, on the legislative side, to present this for our country. 
Interviewer: 02:23 Okay, perfect. Well we'll have the core questions then. Payments and access to the account safety is emphasized as one 
of the key objectives of the second payment directive PSD2, as a result of its implementation, did your organization 
introduce or is planning to introduce any changes to existing security standards affecting final user of your services? If 
yes, which ones and examples could include IT Security infrastructure, an internal security policies, security incident 
management procedures, contingency procedures, new forms of security authorization. 
Bank of Aruba: 03:03 So basically all of the above. It does strike from policy right down to the, oh, you forgot outsourcing policy as well. So 
outsourcing from internal security policies, from, the IT infrastructure as well. So we are planning to build in a different 
infrastructure for supporting of such a payment facilities. If it's a dictates that we would you be using them as well. 
Interviewer: 03:41 Okay. Uh, well that's very brief, but let's stick to that for now. One of the key objectives of PSD2 is to increase level of 
security and confidence of electronic payments. It requires payment service providers such as bank to develop strong 
customer authentication SCA, which combines at least two independent elements, physical such as a card or mobile 
phone, knowledge, passwords or biometric features such as fingerprint before making any payment. Have your organi-
zation had to implement, update or modify in any other way existing security regulations in order to comply with this 
PSD2 regulation? If yes, could you briefly describe what was the scope? 
Bank of Aruba: 04:27 We, we are not, going to roll out for ourselves a payment scheme or payment service as we are a regulator. But of 
course we are, it is our duty to make sure that the financial sector, which encapsulates banks and other financial insti-
tutes, do that in a safe and consistent manner. So for us as an organization, I don't see us in the near future really having 
to do with that. But in the future I think it is our duty to ensure that the financial sector here does comply with that. And 
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I can, I can foresee that it will have impact on safekeeping of all these factors. Cause you mentioned a password biomet-
rics and, and another factor if you wish. So the safe keeping of these of this information is also very crucial cause it'll 
flow now through a third party before it reaches the bank where it was initially already intended to be and also be kept 
safe. 
Interviewer: 05:40 Okay. Perfect. Well, PSD2 led to increased competition on the financial market. New players known as third party 
providers have emerged to compete with traditional banks. Therefore have your organization developed any kind of new 
services, which were a result of the new market situation. And this could include new forms of payments, mobile apps 
forms of authorization, et cetera. 
Bank of Aruba: 06:07 In the market where we are we don't have the legislation yet, but what we do foresee that might happen is that indeed a 
new payment service providers would want to join in. And we will need to actually open the doors to them as well. So 
for our organization directly, no, but we do foresee that maybe, neighboring islands or neighboring nations would, 
would want to participate or even maybe the bigger ones like Google and Facebook I think is also turning to banking 
now as well. I read this morning. 
Interviewer: 06:50 Okay. Well, Third party providers not necessarily need to consist of competitors and in many cases can supplement the 
offer of traditional bank. Have you organization created new partnerships or implement services offered by the provid-
ers that could be a result of implementation of PSD2 directive or is planning to in that case? 
Bank of Aruba: 07:14 I think a yes because we have, currently we are responsible for the payment rails are the national payment rails and we 
have acquired a third party to a for example, assist those with the modernization of this. It's not PSD2 as you would see 
it in its in its pure form. However, it is the first step, to making payments transparent for all parties as well. I think the 
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next step would be that, that through this third party you'll have API's becoming available for which they, they could 
provide or hook their services onto it. 
Interviewer: 07:56 Okay. That's actually, what sort of relates to my next question. Which is, that PSD2 also enforces the data sharing be-
tween the banks and the third party providers and it is mainly done through application programming interface API. 
What would the implications of the this data sharing law in your organization or in this case are presumably going to be 
and is your organization utilizes existing APIs such as OpenBanking, or is planning to use develop their own? 
Bank of Aruba: 08:34 I think it's going to be new APIs. I think specifically developed for us, if we go down that path of using APIs, it'll be 
specifically developed for our purpose. And, and the first part of your question please. 
Interviewer: 08:50 Yes. Well the first, what was the implication this data sharing law on your organization? So basically what could that 
mean in case of the data sharing that is going to be implemented. 
Bank of Aruba: 09:07 That means a lot, I think, if you see how data is, so going back, basically you just share your information with the bank, 
keep it there for your financial, lifetime or life cycle that you are with this bank. Now you are opening the door through 
a different vendor to get to your information and that should be given I think on a case by case basis. So that should be a 
technical advance going to the bank back and forth where the bank also should come back to you and say, okay, are you 
really sure you want me to share this data with a company, A, B, or C? And do you want me to keep reminding you 
every time they ask for your data or they offer you something through this information so it will open the doors of the 
banks. I'm not really sure that they are comfortable with this, but they need to have better measures in place once that 
starts happening, especially with the law on privacy, also applicable in Europe. And for Europeans living abroad as 
well. So it's not that if you're not in Europe that it doesn't apply to you. 
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Interviewer: 10:28 Okay. Yes, please. If you have anything to add then. 
Bank of Aruba: 10:34 No, I think it'll be just major, major implications and, and technical is not even the beginning of, of the complexity that 
it adds. 
Interviewer: 10:46 Okay. Well, last question is more of an open ended and I think in a case of your organization, there's much more to add 
in this. Are there any other changes or other practical implications that your organization has undertaken which would 
result from implementation of PSD2 and could you briefly state them? 
Bank of Aruba: 11:23 I think in our specific, context as a regulator, we will need to be ready for maybe a sandbox solution, where we can host, 
for example, these upcoming spin ups or third parties or a new ventures even, in order to see how we could regulate, 
their actions and products better. I don't, I do think it's a good movement. It does shake up the banking industry a lot, but 
it needs to be understood. Also from a technical perspective, what are these people, offering to the user? Um, where is 
the user data? Is there enough transparency for the end user as to where his data is? And, and also something that's also 
very tricky in case of a breach who is responsible for what, you know, so where does the responsibility end and the 
other starts, because I think, sorry, the bank can also have a say in this. If you know of a shady service, for example, that 
requesting your customers' data that you have worked so hard to protect, and if you know that it's not safe, on the other 
hand, you're not just freely going to give it away without a warning. So it's, it means a lot to technically really, really 
does. And from a regulator perspective, everybody is basically looking at you for guidance. So we need to make sure 
that we are on the ball with that. 
Interviewer: 13:10 Okay. well that pretty much answers all my questions. Well, I'm not, I'm not sure if there's anything else that could be a 
direct, impact on, on the organization that, you haven't mentioned before as well. Basically, it's a, it's a pretty broad 
topic, so it's probably going to unfold a little in the process as well. 
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Bank of Aruba: 13:43 So we can learn from that as well. Yeah, 
Interviewer: 13:48 Yeah, exactly. Well, but that's going to be a little bit later, I suppose. Yeah. Well, okay, well thank you very much then. 
Bank of Aruba: 14:19 Okay, cool. Glad that I could help. 
6.5 Interview 3 Transcript – BlueMedia 
 
Interviewer: 00:54 Well, since you have limited time let’s move on with the opening questions. What is your role in the financial sector? 
Are you representative of payment service provider such as bank, third party provider or legislator? Could you briefly 
describe what do you do? 
Blue Media: 01:25 So, my general occupation is a Product Manager at Blue Media. Although the scope of the actual functions is a bit big-
ger, I can say that pretty much I am responsible for development of the payment gate, so the main sort of service we 
provide, but also KIP and TPP. 
Interviewer: 02:22 Okay, great. Well next question, are you familiar with second payment services directive? If yes, please describe briefly 
what was the scope of your work with PSD2? 
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Blue Media: 02:40 So yes, I have learned about PSD2 while I was already working in Blue Media. I have been working there for some time 
already, but I think I worked with it more since maybe two years ago. I have also participated in the workshops and 
conferences that were related to the PSD2 and we have quite extensive internal documentation of that. 
Interviewer: 03:27 Okay, perfect. Well we'll move on the the core questions then. Payments and access to the account safety is emphasized 
as one of the key objectives of the second payment service directive PSD2 and as a result of its implementation, have 
your organization any changes to existing security standards affecting final user of your services? If that is correct, 
which ones? And  maybe I can give few examples that could be IT Security infrastructure, Internal security policies, 
security incident management procedures, contingency procedures, new forms of security authorization. 
Blue Media: 04:01 Well, we had to adjust in some scope pretty much all of the things that you have mentioned. I am not really able to 
disclose the particular changes that we have implemented, as this is very delicate information, but we have slightly 
adjusted them. But on top of that, well, we are also just developing all aspects of security despite the regulations and we 
do bear in mind the current market regulations and rules. 
Interviewer: 04:45 Okay. Well, I understand that you cannot really provide me with more, so it’s ok. The next question. One of the key 
objectives of PSD2 is to increase level of security and confidence of electronic payments. It requires payment service 
providers such as bank to develop strong customer authentication SCA, which combines at least two independent ele-
ments, physical such as a card or mobile phone, knowledge, passwords or biometric features such as fingerprint before 
making any payment. Have your organization had to implement, update or modify in any other way existing security 
regulations in order to comply with this PSD2 regulation? If yes, could you briefly describe what was the scope? 
Blue Media: 05:27 We are constantly in the process of implementing changes when it comes to Strong Customer Authentication. It is cer-
tainly an important aspect for us, as we value the safety of our customers a lot. So this is an important element. But, at 
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this time we are working on it in more sort of conceptual way. We have not yet implemented it fully, so I would call it a 
conceptual stage. 
Interviewer: 06:14 Okay. Perfect. Well, PSD2 led to increased competition on the financial market. New players known as third party 
providers have emerged to compete with traditional banks. Therefore have your organization developed any kind of new 
services, which were a result of the new market situation. And this could include new forms of payments, mobile apps 
forms of authorization and so on. 
Blue Media: 06:47 I can answer yes to this question. We did implement types of service functions of AIS and PIS from before 14th of 
September. And we are working on new services that will be adjusted to changes for after 14th of September.  
Interviewer: 07:32 Okay, thank you. Next question then, third party providers not necessarily need to consist of competitors and in many 
cases can supplement the offer of traditional bank. Did you, well your organization created new partnerships or imple-
ment services offered by the providers that could be a result of implementation of PSD2 directive? 
Blue Media: 07:55 I think, well yes. We did made some new relations in terms of AIS and the opportunities that have come with it. It is 
mainly for the telecom industry, but also well we will have a closer relation with one other service provider, I think its 
ok if I mention that it will be PayU. But I cannot disclose much more information.  
Interviewer: 08:34 Okay. That’s already very useful information. Well, the following question then that is, PSD2 also enforces the data 
sharing between the banks and the third party providers and traditional banks. It is mainly done through application 
programming interface API. What are the implications of this data sharing law in your organization and is your organi-
zation utilizes existing APIs such as OpenBanking, or is going to develop their own? 
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Blue Media: 08:57 Ok, that is something that we are currently working on quite intensively. We are utilizing both the traditional bank APIs 
which are shared by the ASPSPs and we are building our own. This is one of the elements that we believe that the mar-
ket is heading towards, so yes, it is a big part of our current operations. So the impact is quite severe I would say overall 
of the data sharing in our case. 
Interviewer: 10:02 Okay. Well, this is already the last question and it is more open ended. Are there any other changes or other empirical 
implications that your organization has undertaken which would result from implementation of PSD2 and could you 
briefly describe them? 
Blue Media: 10:26 Yes, we of course have experienced some. It allows for more business development strategies, generally we perceive 
PSD2 as sort of the incubator for changes that might come, sort of like the starting point for more changes. So it is very 
important to our organization to look through it very well and look where else we can develop and grow. For now, I can 
just say that we are researching the market mainly, looking for opportunities and threats and try to respond to them 
accordingly.  
Interviewer: 11:30 Okay. That was the last of it. Well, is there anything else that you could add?  
Blue Media: 11:42 Well, due to the profile of our company I can only share general information I am afraid. But hope it was enough to 
help. 
Interviewer: 12:03 Sure, I mean thank you a lot. Thank you for taking your time. Hope you have a great day and thanks again. 
 
Blue Media:  12:18  Okay, thank you. Bye. 
 
